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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ATTORNEY
RESPONSIBILITY
FOR FEES OF AN OPPOSING PARTY
Amy Salyzyn*

INTRODUCTION
The American civil litigation system has a number of
distinguishing features.
This reality has led scholars of
comparative civil procedure to remark upon and consider the
consequences of what they have termed “American
exceptionalism” in civil procedure.1 One commonly cited example
of “exceptional” American procedure is the “American rule” of
costs allocation or the “no cost-shifting rule”: the losing party is
not required to indemnify the prevailing party for the court costs
and attorney fees that the prevailing party has incurred in the
course of the litigation.2
Notwithstanding this general rule, there are a number of
circumstances in which a party in the American system may be
indemnified for expenses incurred in a lawsuit.3 One such
circumstance is the case in which an attorney is found to have
improperly conducted himself or herself and, as a result, is held to
be personally responsible for the attorney fees of an opposing
party. The United States is not unique in empowering courts to
impose personal responsibility upon a lawyer for the costs of
* J.S.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, J.D., University of Toronto. The author
completed an earlier draft of this paper during her L.L.M. studies at Yale Law
School in the context of a course entitled “Comparative Civil Procedure” taught
by Professor John H. Langbein. The author is grateful to Professor Langbein for
his insights, encouragement and helpful comments.
1
See Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure,
50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 280-281 (2002) (stating that civil procedure in
comparative perspective reveals that American disputing is an example of
exceptionalism); see also Scott Dodson, Review Essay, The Challenge of
Comparative Civil Procedure Civil Litigation in Comparative Context, 60 ALA.
L. REV. 133, 141 (2008) (stating that “American procedure is particularly
different because of its strong exceptionalism”); see also Richard L. Marcus,
Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism into a Globalized Context, 53 AM.
J. COMP. L. 709, 709 (2005) (explaining that American proceduralists have not
been comparativists in large part due to American exceptionalism).
2
See Dodson, supra note 1, at 141 (noting the “exceptional” nature of the
“American rule” of cost allocation); see also Marcus, supra note 1, at 709–12
(discussing that America has a set of procedural characteristics that set it off
from the rest of the world); see also James R. Maxeiner, Cost and Fee
Allocation in Civil Procedure, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 215–17 (2010)
(characterizing a “no indemnity practice” as being “peculiar to America”).
3
See John F. Vargo, The American Rule of Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured
Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 1567, 1629 (1993).
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litigation. However, this power of the courts has not been the
subject of any comparative scholarship. In this paper, I compare
the American practice of requiring attorneys to pay personally the
fees of opposing parties to analogous practices in two other
common law jurisdictions: England and Canada.
Comparing the law in this area in England and Canada to
the law in the United States is a useful endeavor because each
country shares in the common law tradition but also differs from
each other in material respects. Unlike the United States, both
England and Canada implement a “loser pays” system of costs.
Further, in the context of considering an attorney’s personal
liability for costs, England has historically differed from Canada
and the United States in one material respect in its approach to
lawyer regulation: until very recently, English law recognized the
doctrine of “advocates’ immunity.” Under this doctrine, discussed
below, both barristers and solicitors enjoyed significant immunity
from liability to clients in negligence.
Given these material differences among the three countries,
one might predict that each country would employ a unique
approach to assessing the circumstances in which lawyers should
be required to pay costs personally due to improper conduct. In
fact, the law in each country on this issue reveals a trend of
convergence. The United States, England, and Canada have all
shifted in recent years to the use of an objective test that imports a
standard of negligence in determining if a lawyer should be
personally responsible for litigation costs.
The first three sections of this paper will consist of a
country-by-country review of developments over the last several
decades in relation to an attorney’s personal liability for costs,
beginning with the United States and continuing with England and
then Canada. In order to make this task manageable with respect
to the two federal countries studied, I have limited my analysis
with respect to the United States to the federal court system and in
regards to Canada, to the province of Ontario. The fourth and final
section of this paper will be devoted to exploring the following two
questions: (a) what might be the reason (or reasons) that explain
this cross-jurisdictional trend toward a negligence standard, and (b)
is this trend desirable? With respect to the first inquiry, my
analysis will focus on what connections might drawn between the
cross-jurisdictional move to a negligence standard and broader
incursions on the self-regulation of lawyers in each of these
countries in recent years. Regarding the second inquiry, I will
consider the coherence (or lack thereof) of importing a negligence
standard into this context. Ultimately, I argue that there are a
number of reasons to be concerned about the adoption of a

Fall 2012] A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ATTORNEY
RESPONSIBILITY FOR FEES OF AN OPPOSING PARTY 73

negligence standard in this area and highlight several issues for
further consideration.
I.

THE UNITED STATES

In the United States, federal courts have both inherent
jurisdiction and statutory authority to require a lawyer to pay the
attorney fees of an opposing party resulting from attorney conduct
that the court determines is improper. The United States Supreme
Court has held that the federal courts’ exercise of their inherent
jurisdiction to assess such attorney’s fees requires a finding of
conduct either “constituting” or “tantamount to” bad faith.4 In
addition to this inherent jurisdiction, there are two main statutory
mechanisms that empower federal courts to require an attorney to
pay all or part of an opposing party’s attorney fees: 28 U.S.C. §
1927 and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 With
respect to Section 1927,6 the circuit courts have generally held that
bad faith, recklessness, or intentional misconduct must be made
out before fees may be imposed on a lawyer personally. 7 In
4

See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980) (holding that the
court must make a finding as to whether counsel’s conduct was tantamount to
bad faith preceding any sanction).
5
See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1980) (stating that any attorney who so multiplies the
proceedings in any case vexatiously may be required to satisfy the attorneys’
fees incurred because of such conduct); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (stipulating
that if warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on a motion for
sanctions the attorney’s fees incurred). It should be noted that, in addition to
Rule 11, there are several other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
authorize federal courts to require an attorney to pay the attorney fees of an
opposing party. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f)(2) (stating that, instead of or in
addition to any other sanction, the court is required to order that the party and/or
its attorney pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of non-compliance
with the rule, including attorney’s fees); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3)
(threatening sanctions, including attorney’s fees, if certain documents are
unsigned).
6
28 U.S.C.A. § 1927 (2012) provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any
court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally
the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably
incurred because of such conduct.
7
See Lindsey Simmons-Gonzalez, Comment, Abandoning the American Rule:
Imposing Sanctions on an Empty Head Despite a Pure Heart, 34 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REV. 307, 316–18 (2009). As observed by Simmons-Gonzalez, although
generally a standard of bad faith, recklessness, or intentional misconduct has
been found to be required, the circuit courts have taken significantly different
approaches as to how this needs to be established. See id. For example, the
Tenth Circuit recently held that an objective standard applies to Section 1927
and permits fee awards against attorneys who manifest “intentional or reckless
disregard of [their] duties to the court,” Kornfeld v. Kornfeld, 393 F. App’x 575,
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contrast, Rule 11 now employs an objective standard from which
liability may be found on the basis of negligent conduct. In its
original form as introduced in 1938, Rule 11 had been interpreted
as imposing a subjective standard that focused on the bad faith of
the attorney.8 The evolution of Rule 11 will be the focus of the
following sections.
A.

The Introduction of Rule 11 in 1938

As first enacted in 1938, Rule 11 required that every
pleading be signed by an attorney of record9 and provided, inter
alia:
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate
by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief there is
good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or
is signed with the intent to defeat the purpose of the
rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the
action may proceed as though the pleading had not
been served. For a wilful violation of this rule an
attorney may be subjected to appropriate
disciplinary action.10
Rule 11 was not an entirely new procedural innovation in 1938.
As observed by the Federal Rules Advisory Committee11 in
accompanying notes to Rule 11, the rule “consolidated a number of
pleading practices found in (1) certain code states at the time the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted, (2) the former
federal equity rules, and (3) English practice.”12
579 (10th Cir. 2010), while the Second Circuit recently confirmed that section
1927 requires subjective bad faith of counsel, Advanced Magnetic Closures, Inc.
v. Rome Fastener Corp., 607 F.3d 817, 834 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
8
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (stating
that Rule 11 was amended to remedy the subjective bad-faith standard of the
original rule).
9
In cases where a party was self-represented, that party was required to sign the
pleading himself and state his address. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
10
See id.
11
See J. Thomas F. Hogan, The Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, UNITED STATE COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/
RulemakingProcess/SummaryBenchBar.aspx (last visited Dec. 17, 2010)
(providing an account of the federal rulemaking process, focusing on the
Advisory Committee’s role in that process).
12
5A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1331 (3d ed. Supp. 2010). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 11
advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment; But see D. Michael
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In several respects, the original Rule 11 embodied a
subjective test. Regarding the propriety of the pleading at issue,
the rule mandated an inquiry into what the attorney knew and
believed of the pleading: whether to “the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief,” the pleading was supported by “good
grounds” and “not interposed for delay.” The “awareness standard”
contained in this part of the rule “mirrored both the early equity
signature and code pleading verification standards as to merits and
extended only to matters within the knowledge and belief of the
attesting party.”13
The sanction provisions under the original Rule 11 also
invoked a subjective test.14 As originally enacted, Rule 11
provided two non-exclusive options: (a) striking the pleading; or
(b) disciplining the attorney. A signed pleading could only be
struck if the court found the pleading to have been signed “with
intent to defeat the purpose of the rule.” Similarly, an attorney
could only be disciplined if he or she committed an intentional
(i.e., “wilful”) violation of the rule. An improper motive on the
part of the attorney was, therefore, a necessary requirement for
sanctions.
On its face, then, the text of the original Rule 11 mandated
two phases of subjective inquiry. First, in order to find that the
rule had been violated, it was necessary for the court to conclude
that—contrary to what the attorney certified by his signature—it
was not the case that to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief there was good ground to support the pleading and that the
pleading was not interposed for delay. Second, if a violation of the
rule was found, the court needed to find that the attorney
intentionally violated the rule before imposing a sanction.
Prior to being amended in 1983, Rule 11 was rarely used.
The first reported case of a Rule 11 motion is not found until
1950.15 Between 1938 and 1976, only 19 cases of Rule 11 motions

Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some “Striking” Problems
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 8 n.20 (1976)
(highlighting how the enforcement provisions of Rule 11 were not properly
drafted).
13
See Carol Rice Andrews, Motive Restrictions on Court Access: A First
Amendment Challenge, 61 OHIO ST. L. J. 665, 706–07 (2000) (discussing how
the original version of Rule 11 was composed of two subjective elements).
14
Id.
15
See Risinger, supra note 12, at 35 n.115 (noting that United States v. Long, 10
F.R.D. 443 (D. Neb. 1950) is the first reported case of a “genuine adversary”
Rule 11 motion).
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are reported.16 In those few cases where courts heard Rule 11
motions, the courts were faithful to the subjective test embodied in
the text of the rule. An example of the court applying a subjective
test under Rule 11 can be found in the first reported case in 1950,
United States v. Long.17 In this case, the plaintiff had moved to
strike the defendant’s answer that had consisted solely of “a
general denial made in a single sentence.” In reply to the motion,
counsel for the defendant filed a brief affirming the defendant’s
intention to “put into issue every allegation of plaintiff's complaint
upon the trial of this cause.” Given the nature of the complaint, the
court commented on the “improbability” of the defendant actually
intending to deny each and every allegation of the plaintiff.
Nonetheless, the court denied the Rule 11 motion, noting “counsel
for the defendant…assures this court that his client intends to
controvert ‘every allegation of the plaintiff's complaint’” and
holding that the court was “compelled to accept those assurances
as being tendered in good faith.”18 Following United States v.
Long, the courts continued to frame the question under Rule 11 as
requiring a demonstration that the attorney had failed to act in
“good faith.”19 This high standard, along with uncertainty
regarding when sanctions should be brought and what sanctions
were available,20 is often cited as the reason why Rule 11 motions
were
so
rarely
brought.
B.
The Introduction of a Negligence Standard: The 1983
Amendments to Rule 11
16

See id. at 34–37 (showing how cases have rarely imposed sanctions on Rule
11 grounds).
17
United States v. Long, 10 F.R.D. 443, 444 (D. Neb. 1950) (holding that the
defendant did not violate Rule 11 because he acted in good faith).
18
See id. at 445.
19
See, e.g., Murchison v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 14, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (noting that
“the basic question is whether the attorneys in good faith believed there was
good ground to support the charges”); see also Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d
339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that “[t]he standard under Rule 11 . . . is bad
faith”).
20
5A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1331 (3d ed. Supp. 2010) explains the issue of
ambiguity as follows:
By the early 1980's experience had shown that Rule 11 rarely
was utilized and appeared to be ineffective in deterring abuses
in federal civil litigation. A significant contributing factor
apparently was the inherent ambiguity of the original rule. As
the Advisory Committee noted in connection with the 1983
amendment: “There has been considerable confusion as to (1)
the circumstances that should trigger striking a pleading or
motion or taking disciplinary action, (2) the standard of
conduct expected of attorneys who sign pleadings and
motions, and (3) the range of available and appropriate
sanctions.” (footnotes omitted).
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In 1983, amendments were introduced to Rule 11. The
Advisory Committee characterized the amendments as correcting
for the failure of the originally enacted rule to deter litigation
abuses effectively.21 Additionally, the Committee observed that
there had been “considerable confusion as to (1) the circumstances
that should trigger striking a pleading or motion or taking
disciplinary action, (2) the standard of conduct expected of
attorneys who sign pleadings and motions, and (3) the range of
available and appropriate sanctions.”22
The main motivation behind the 1983 amendments appears
to have been the growing concern at the time with the litigation
culture in the federal courts. As summarized by Paul Carrington
and Andrew Wasson, “[t]he 1983 version of Rule 11 was designed
to address a perceived social problem—that there were too many
civil proceedings and too much motion practice in federal courts
and that this costly excess was the result of neglect, indifference,
or misuse of procedure by counsel.”23 Georgene Vairo has
attributed the choice of the Advisory Committee to seek to address
this problem through Rule 11, in particular, to the failure of
Committee’s previous attempt in 1970 to curb litigation abuses
through amendments to Rule 37’s provisions dealing with
discovery-related misconduct.24 Rule 11 was a natural choice for
the Committee to use as a reforming mechanism “because it was
the only rule dealing with attorney conduct per se.”25
An additional possible motivation behind the Rule 11
amendments, although not explicitly acknowledged by the
Advisory Committee, was the perceived need to more effectively
21

FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment.
See id. (discussing the confusion surrounding frivolous motions and
pleadings, including when to strike a motion or pleading, or what sanctions are
available and appropriate to levy against an attorney for filing a frivolous motion
or pleading).
23
See Paul D. Carrington & Andrew Wasson, A Reflection on Rulemaking: The
Rule 11 Experience, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 563, 564 (2004) (discussing that the
1983 amendment was designed to remedy the perceived abuse of motion
practice in civil litigation). However, the authors further observe, that:
“[w]hether there was or is in fact such a problem remains uncertain. There had
been an increase in civil filings in the decade of the 1970s, but much of it was
explained by changes in substantive law, notably in the field of civil rights.” See
id.
24
See Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
589, 594–96 (1998) (explaining the historical background surrounding Rule
37’s ineffectiveness, and the rise of Rule 11’s use in its place).
25
See id. at 595 (noting how Rule 11 was drafted to directly address the claims
attorneys can bring in court by requiring an attorney’s signature endorsing any
document submitted to the court).
22
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punish attorney misconduct.26 In the 1970s and early 1980s, the
behavior of attorneys was under particular scrutiny. In 1976, then
Chief Justice Warren Burger expressed his alarm at the
“widespread feeling that the legal profession and judges are overly
tolerant to lawyers who exploit the inherently contentious aspects
of the adversary system to their own private advantage at public
expense.”27 The involvement of lawyers “in the Watergate scandal
had pushed the profession’s public image to new lows.”28 As
public criticism of lawyers was growing, the American Bar
Association (“ABA”) was taking steps during this time period to
be more aggressive in enforcing professional norms. In 1970, the
ABA replaced the largely aspirational Canons of Professional
Ethics promulgated in 1908 with a Model Code of Professional
Responsibility “containing black-letter law known as Disciplinary
Rules…. [the violation of which would result] not merely in
fraternal disapprobation but in disciplinary adjudication, with
court-imposed penalties.”29 In 1983, the same year as the
amendments to Rule 11, the ABA supplanted the Model Code with
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility “which consisted more
or less exclusively of specific, legally cognizable rules drafted by a
quasilegislative process.”30 The environment in which the 1983
amendments to Rule 11 took place, therefore, was one of
significantly increased scrutiny of lawyer conduct and of interest in
increased regulation of the profession.
The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 introduced several major
changes, including: (1) extending the rule to apply not only to
pleadings but to motions and all other litigation “papers”; (2)
making the imposition of sanctions mandatory upon a finding that
the rule had been violated; and (3) explicitly including among the
available sanctions an order that the offending attorney pay the
“reasonable attorney’s fee” of an opposing party.31 Of particular
26

See S. M. Kassin, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS, 29 (Federal
Judicial Center 1985), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rule11study.pdf/$file/rule11study.pdf
(explaining that while the Advisory Committee articulated only a deterrence
rationale, the need to punish more effectively may have also prompted the Rule
11 amendments).
27
See H.R. REP. 104-62, at 9 (1995).
28
See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 200 (2000) (discussing how the role that the lawyers played
in the Watergate Scandal led the ABA to require law schools teach a class on
professional responsibility).
29
See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239,
1251 (1991).
30
See DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY
IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE 233 (2008).
31
See FED. R. CIV. P 11 ; see also Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical
Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 191 n.8 (1988) (recognizing that courts had been split
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importance to the analysis here is the language change in the part
of the rule addressing the significance to be attributed to the
attorney’s signature on the pleading. After the 1983 amendments,
Rule 11 provided inter alia:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the pleading,
motion, or other paper; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
of
litigation.32
The language in the original rule requiring a “wilful violation” was
replaced with language requiring that the attorney conduct a
“reasonable inquiry” into the appropriateness and sufficiency of
the pleading. This change imposed an affirmative duty that the
attorney conduct “some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the
law.”33 The Advisory Committee indicated that this duty was to be
measured by the standard of “reasonableness under the
circumstances.”34 Bad faith was no longer a precondition and,
under the amended wording, “merely negligent or reckless
behavior” could result in sanctions.35
In short, the 1983
amendments “shift[ed] the focus away from inquiring into what the
attorney actually knew about the law and facts of the case when he
or she filed a pleading….[to] what the lawyer should have known
after conducting a ‘reasonable inquiry.’”36
The 1983 amendments had a dramatic effect on the
frequency of Rule 11 motions. Within five years, over 1,000 Rule
11 cases were reported37 and, by 1991, over 3,000 cases.38
prior to the amendment as to whether the original version of Rule 11 permitted
the payment of attorney fees).
32
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (emphasis added).
33
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note.
34
See id.
35
See Vairo, supra note 31, at 193 (excluding bad faith as a requirement to
sanction an attorney under the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 motions).
36
See Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 NW. U. L.
REV. 943, 947–48 (1992) (showing that the 1983 amendments switched the
inquiry about a lawyer’s knowledge of a case from a subjective approach to an
objective approach).
37
See Alan E. Untereiner, A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 YALE
L.J., 901, 901 (1988).
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Although some early cases following the 1983 amendments
continued using a subjective “bad faith” standard, by the end of
1986 all the circuits acknowledged that the amended rule imposed
an objective standard of reasonable inquiry.39 In addition to
requiring that the attorney conduct an objectively reasonable
inquiry into the facts and law underlying the claim, a number of
courts held that the amended rule also imposed a reasonableness
requirement on the attorney’s determination that the pleading was
proper.40 As articulated by the Second Circuit in Eastway
Construction Corp. v. City of New York, “sanctions shall be
imposed against an attorney…where, after reasonable inquiry, a
competent attorney could not form a reasonable belief that the
pleading is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal
of existing law.”41
The language adopted by the court in Eastway Construction
and by the Advisory Committee in introducing the amended Rule
11 closely tracks language used in articulating the standard of care
owed by an attorney to his or her client in the legal malpractice
context.42 A number of courts have recognized that the revised
Rule 11 effectively adopted a negligence standard or, at the very
least, a standard closely comparable to negligence. The Supreme
Court has made obiter references to a negligence standard being
employed by Rule 11 in two cases. In Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp.,43 Justice O’Connor observed that “the considerations
involved in the Rule 11 context are similar to those involved in
determining negligence.”44 A year later, in Business Guides, Inc.
v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc.,45 the Supreme
Court considered whether Rule 11 imposed a duty of an
objectively reasonable inquiry on parties (as opposed to only
attorneys) who sign pleadings, motions, or other papers. The
38

See Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going,
60 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 480 (1991) (displaying the increase in Rule 11
motions by 1991).
39
See GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES
AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES 5–9 (2d ed. 1992).
40
See id.
41
See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253–54 (2d
Cir. 1985) (explaining the replacement of subjective bad faith with a standard of
how a competent attorney might reasonably act under the circumstances).
42
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 (2011)
(stating that in order to avoid liability for professional negligence, a lawyer
“must exercise the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in
similar circumstances”).
43
See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
44
Id. at 402.
45
See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’n. Enters, Inc., 498 U.S. 533
(1991).
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majority found that Rule 11 did impose such a duty on the parties
as well. In a dissent, Justice Kennedy made explicit reference to
“the majority’s negligence standard.”46 A number of lower courts
have also explicitly drawn the connection between the 1983
amendments and the imposition of a negligence standard. For
example, in Hays v. Sony Corp. of America,47 the Seventh Circuit
commented that “in effect, [Rule 11] imposes a negligence
standard, for negligence is a failure to use reasonable care” and
that Rule 11, therefore, “defines a new form of legal
malpractice.”48 In Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A.,49
the Seventh Circuit similarly noted that because Rule 11
“establishes a new form of negligence (legal malpractice),” the rule
“creates duties to one’s adversary and to the legal system, just as
tort law creates duties to one’s client.”50 The Third Circuit has
also characterized the 1983 amendments as having been intended
“to prevent abuse caused not only by bad faith but by negligence
and, to some extent, by professional incompetence.”51
The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 drew considerable
criticism. As observed by Vairo, “in contrast to its pre-1983
obscurity, amended Rule 11 met with more controversy than
perhaps any other Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.”52 Following
the 1983 amendments, both academic commentators and legal
46

Id. at 566 (asserting that the majority’s standard was simply a negligence
standard).
47
Hays v. Sony Corp. of Amer., 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988), abrogated on
other grounds by Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
48
See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Amer., 847 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 1988)
(explaining the role that Rule 11 plays in legal malpractice claims); see also
Vista Mfg., Inc. v. Trac-4, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 134, 137 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (noting
that the Rule 11 standard is an objective one, which imposes sanctions on
attorneys who fail to use reasonable care); see also PaineWebber, Inc. v. Can
Am Fin. Grp., 121 F.R.D. 324, 330 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
49
Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1989).
50
See id. at 932 (indicating that attorneys owe a duty to their adversaries and
the legal system to avoid excessive legal expenses and wasting the court’s time);
see also Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, 802 F.2d 247, 255 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing the court’s ability to
impose Rule 11 sanctions against attorneys who assert baseless claims).
51
See Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1987) (confirming that
negligence is sufficient to impose Rule 11 sanctions and that a finding of bad
faith is not necessary); see also Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156
(3d Cir. 1986) (holding that a finding of subjective bad faith is not the only
predicate to a Rule 11 violation).
52
See Vairo, supra note 24, at 591 (noting that there have been numerous
commentaries and journal articles analyzing and critiquing the application of
Rule 11); see also Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure
Reform in Comparative Context: The United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP.
L. 675, 679 (1997) (explaining that the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 suffered
severe criticisms, particularly with respect to the federal circuits’ failure to
uniformly apply Rule 11).
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practitioners reached the conclusion that Rule 11 was being
overused, that it was burdening court dockets with satellite
litigation, and that it was generating an undue “chilling effect” on
novel or unusual claims.53 During this period of time, the threat of
a potential Rule 11 motion loomed large for attorneys. In one
study of attorneys practicing in the Fifth, Seventh and Ninth
Circuits, 32% of respondents indicated that they had been counsel
or co-counsel in a federal district court case where a Rule 11
motion or show cause order had been brought during the last
year.54 Because the most commonly ordered sanction for violating
Rule 11 following the 1983 amendments was attorneys’ fees,55
which could be quite substantial,56 parties had a strong incentive to
bring Rule 11 motions. The “new form of negligence” established
by the amendments to Rule 11 had taken on a life of its own.
C.
The Addition of Safeguards:
Rule 11

The 1993 Amendments to

In response to criticisms of the 1983 amendments, Rule 11
was further amended in 1993.57 This set of amendments
introduced a number of provisions that had the aim of tempering
the use and effect of the rule. Although sanctions had become
mandatory in the 1983 amendments, the 1993 rule reverted to

53

For a discussion of criticisms of the 1983 amendments, see 5A CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1332 (3d ed. Supp. 2010) (asserting that Rule 11 has a
chilling effect on vigorous advocacy especially for public interest and civil
rights plaintiffs); see also Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to
“Frivolous” Litigation: A Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State
Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1082–83 (1994) ; see also Vairo,
supra note 38, at 484–86 (arguing that Rule 11 has a chilling effect on zealous
advocacy, particularly in civil rights, employment discrimination, certain kinds
of securities fraud, and RICO cases).
54
See Marshall, supra note 36, at 952.
55
See STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE
THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, 36
(1989); see also GREGORY JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF
LITIGATION ABUSE 1-13 (4th ed. 2011).
56
Two extreme examples of this can be found in the Eleventh Circuit case of
Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 502 U.S. 1048
(1992), wherein the court affirmed the district court’s order finding plaintiffs’
lead counsel, counsel’s law firm, and the plaintiffs were jointly and severally
liable for over $1 million in fees.
57
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (amended 1993). The version of Rule 11 following the
1993 amendments essentially continues to be the rule in place today. Following
the 1993 amendments, Rule 11 was again amended in 2007. These
amendments, however, introduced only stylistic changes in addition to a
provision that all papers include the signer’s email address.
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permissive sanctions.58 The 1983 rule was further softened by
adding a “safe harbor” provision that requires a party to wait 21
days after serving a motion under Rule 11 before filing the motion,
in order to allow for the served party to withdraw or correct the
challenged litigation paper.59 The purpose was to encourage a
party to “to abandon a questionable contention” without fear that
the abandonment could be used as evidence of a Rule 11
violation.60 Additionally, the 1993 amendments clarified that the
court could issue Rule 11 sanctions on its own initiative, but only
through a show cause order.61
With respect to the standard to be applied to attorney
conduct, the 1993 version of Rule 11 retained an objective test
requiring the signing attorney to certify the paper’s appropriateness
“to the best of [his or her] knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances.”62
Further, the 1993 amendments deleted the previous exception for
“good faith arguments” for the extension, modification or reversal
of existing law, and replaced it with an exception for “nonfrivolous
argument[s].”63 This change “eliminate[d] any possibility of
reading the language in Rule 11 as establishing a subjective
standard.”64
Regarding sanctions, the 1993 amendments emphasized the
deterrent purpose of the rule, introducing language into Rule 11
58

See id. (providing that if the court determines that a violation has occurred, the
court “may impose an appropriate sanction”).
59
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2) (stating that a motion for sanctions must describe
the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b) but cannot be filed within
21 days after service or within another time the court sets).
60
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory comm. notes (1993) (stating that under the
1993 amendments, a timely withdrawal of a questionable contention will protect
a party against a motion for sanctions).
61
See id. (requiring a show cause order when the court issues Rule 11 sanctions
sua sponte in order to provide the person with notice and an opportunity to
respond); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4) (limiting sanctions to those sufficient
to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others in similar
situations).
62
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (stating that the objective test for attorney
certification applies to pleadings, written motions, or other papers, whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating the motion for sanctions).
63
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (obligating that claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions presented to the court are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law).
64
See 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1335 (3d ed. Supp. 2011) (illustrating that removing the “good faith”
terminology in the prior text and replacing it with a “nonfrivolous” benchmark
prohibits interpreting the language of Rule 11 as establishing a subjective
standard).
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that “a sanction imposed under this rule must be limited to what
suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct
by others similarly situated.”65 The Advisory Committee notes to
the 1993 amendments state that “since the purpose of Rule 11
sanctions is to deter rather than to compensate, the rule provides
that, if a monetary sanction is imposed, it should ordinarily be paid
into court as a penalty.”66 In practice, awards of attorney fees have
decreased since the 1993 amendments but remain common.67
The number of Rule 11 motions also decreased
significantly following the 1993 amendments.68 One reason may
be that the amendments eliminated the possibility for a defendant
to file a Rule 11 motion after the court has adjudicated the merits
of the claim.69 As noted by Charles Yablon, “under the 1993
version of Rule 11, and the subsequent case law, parties cannot
make Rule 11 motions after the merits of the case have been
decided, since that would deprive the opposing party of their safe
harbor withdrawal rights [under the rule].”70 As a result, the
moving party is deprived “of the powerful ‘hindsight effect’ under
which [a judge], having just dismissed or having decided to
dismiss a case as non-meritorious, [is] then asked whether the
claim lacked such a basis in law or fact that it should never have
been brought in the first place.”71
Following the 1993 amendments, the courts have continued
to acknowledge that Rule 11 imposes a standard of “objective
65

See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4) (explaining the scope of sanctions under Rule 11).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory comm. note (1993) (maintaining that the
purpose of the sanctions is to deter parties, not compensate them).
67
See GREGORY JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE
2–265 (4th ed. 2008); see also Howard A. Cutler, Comment, A Practitioner’s
Guide to the 1993 Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 67 TEMP.
L. REV. 265, 292 (1994) (suggesting that under the 1993 amendment, judges
will not consistently award attorneys’ fees).
68
See Danielle Kie Hart, Still Chilling After All these Years: Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its Impact on Federal Civil Rights
Plaintiffs after the 1993 Amendments, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 104–05 (2002)
(opining that the decrease in number of federal cases citing Rule 11 is indicative
of a decrease in the use of the Rule itself); see also Charles Yablon, Hindsight,
Regret and Safe Harbors in Rule 11 Litigation, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 599, 600
(2004) (stating that the amendment to Rule 11 could have reduced the number of
motions filed due to financial considerations).
69
See Charles Yablon, Hindsight, Regret and Safe Harbors in Rule 11
Litigation, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 599, 618–32 (2004) (providing various
arguments for and against the possibility that the amendments to Rule 11
decreased its usage in motion practice).
70
Id. at 630 (referencing a 1988 study revealing that approximately fifty percent
of Rule 11 motions occur following the conclusion of an action).
71
Id. at 604.
66
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reasonableness under the circumstances”72 and have continued to
recognize the negligence standard inhering in Rule 11. In 2003,
the Seventh Circuit again analogized Rule 11 litigation to tort law,
commenting that the rule "establishes a new form of negligence,"
in which one owes a "duty to one's adversary to avoid needless
legal costs and delay."73 The Fifth Circuit, contrasting Rule 11 to
Section 1927, observed in 2009 that the former is “about mere
negligence” as opposed to intentional wrongdoing.74
Notwithstanding the fact that courts have acknowledged
that Rule 11 imposes a standard of objective reasonableness,
judges have taken a number of measures to temper the impact of
using a negligence standard in this context and have judicially
added to the statutory safeguards implemented by the 1993
amendments. For example, one notable exception to the courts’
continued use of an objective standard has occurred in the context
of sua sponte (court-initiated) sanctions. In the case of In re
Pennie & Edmonds LLP,75 the Second Circuit held that the lack of
a “safe harbor” provision in the case of court-initiated applications
of Rule 11 necessitated increased procedural protections in the
form of a heightened intent element.76 Specifically, the court held
that a “bad faith” standard should apply to the application of Rule
11 in this context. The Eighth and Eleventh Circuit have issued
decisions consistent with the holding in In re Pennie & Edmonds
LLP, while the First Circuit has explicitly rejected the Second
Circuit’s approach.77
Further mitigating moves can be found in court decisions
interpreting the standard of attorney conduct to be applied in noncourt initiated applications. In the Ninth Circuit, for example, it
has been held that it is necessary to determine that the complaint is
legally or factually “baseless” from an objective perspective before
72

See 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE &
RICHARD L. MARCUS,FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1335 (3d ed. Supp.
2010) (noting that jurisprudence leading up to the 1993 amendment continues to
serve as valid precedent) ; see also Joseph, supra note 55.
73
Divane v. Krull Elec. Co., 319 F.3d 307, 315 (7th Cir. Ill. 2003) (citing Mars
Steel Corp. v. Cont. Bank , 880 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1989)).
74
Vanderhoff v. Pacheco, 344 Fed. Appx. 22, 27 (5th Cir. La. 2009) (citing
Baulch v. Johns, 70 F.3d 813, 817 (5th Cir. 1995)).
75
In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86 (2nd Cir. 2003).
76
See id. at 91 (reasoning that it is better to question evidence by the use of
cross-examination and opposing evidence rather than to inhibit lawyers from
presenting questionable evidence).
77
For a discussion of this divide in the case law, see Sybil Louise Dunlop, Are
an Empty Head and a Pure Heart Enough? Mens Rea Standards for JudgeImposed Rule 11 Sanctions and Their Effects on Attorney Action, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 615, 631–38 (2008) (comparing the approaches of the First, Second, and
Fifth Circuits in interpreting In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP).
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sanctions can be awarded.78 Similarly, the First Circuit has
asserted that “at least culpable carelessness” is required before a
violation of the Rule can be found.79 Moreover, several circuits
have endorsed a requirement that a legal argument advanced have
“no chance of success” under existing precedent in order to run
afoul of the provisions of Rule 11.80 The language used in these
cases reaches beyond conventional understandings of an “objective
reasonableness” standard to impose a higher threshold before Rule
11 sanctions are ordered.
As reflected in the above examples, the precise contours of
the “new form of negligence” instituted by Rule 11 remain to be
articulated. This reality can also been seen in the varied
circumstances in which courts have imposed Rule 11 sanctions.
Lawyers have been sanctioned under Rule 11 for filing a “generic
complaint” that listed “hypothetical violations” of the law;81 for
failing to make a basic inquiry that would have revealed that a
witness who signed two affidavits and claimed to be an attending
physician in an operating room had, in fact, been suspended from
the practice of medicine at the relevant time;82 for engaging in
“blatant forum-shopping”;83 for filing a federal court action in an
78

See Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that a district court must first determine whether the complaint is legally or
factually baseless, and then whether the attorney conducted a reasonable
investigation before signing the complaint).
79
See Citibank Global Mkts., Inc. v. Rodríguez Santana, 573 F.3d 17, 32 (1st
Cir. 2009) (explaining that Rule 11(b) is not a strict liability provision).
80
See Simon DeBartolo Grp., L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Grp., Inc., 186 F.3d 157,
167 (2d Cir.1999) (explaining that for a position to be frivolous there must be no
chance of success and no reasonable argument to amend the current law); see
also Morris v. Wachovia Sec., Inc., 448 F.3d 268, 277 (4th Cir.
2006) (citing Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 153 (4th Cir.
2002)) (noting that a legal argument fails to satisfy Rule 11(b) when a
reasonable attorney in like circumstances could not believe his actions to be
legally justified); see also Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1278–79
(3d Cir. 1994) (holding that where an attorney signs and files a document after
conducting a reasonable inquiry, the attorney is not in violation of Rule 11); see
also Citibank Global Mkts., 573 F.3d 17, 32 (stating that the mere fact that a
claim ultimately fails is not enough to impose Rule 11 sanctions).
81
See Pickern v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc., 339 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1091–92 (E.D.
Cal. 2004) (holding that the plaintiff’s attorney violated Rule 11 but that
monetary sanctions were not warranted because counsel thereafter sought to
amend its pleadings in other matters before the court).
82
See Pfizer, Inc. v. Y2K Shipping & Trading Inc., No. 00-CV-5304-SJ, 2004
WL 896952, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2004) (reasoning that the attorney could
have withdrawn the affidavit pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(A) after learning that it
was false).
83
See Fransen v. Terps LLC, 153 F.R.D. 655, 660 (D. Colo. 1994) (concluding
that a plaintiff that brought a case in federal court in hopes that the result will be
more favorable than the holding from state court is blatant forum shopping).
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attempt to influence a parallel lawsuit in another state;84 bringing
an unwarranted Rule 11 motion;85 and for exhibiting “a pattern of
uncooperativeness and delay [that] had begun before litigation
even commenced.”86 Given the uncertainty as to what, exactly, a
negligence standard means in this context and the varied
circumstances in which Rule 11 sanctions are imposed, it is not
surprising that concerns remain about Rule 11’s potential “chilling
effect” on vigorous advocacy or the bringing of novel or creative
claims.87
II.

ENGLAND

In England, the power of the court to order a lawyer to pay
the costs88 of an opposing party as a consequence of the lawyer’s
improper conduct is referred to as the “wasted costs jurisdiction.”
As in the United States, the authority for this type of order is found
both in the courts’ inherent jurisdiction to discipline lawyers as
well as in statutory provisions. As in the United States, English
law has also moved over the last several decades to a negligence
standard and has adopted safeguards to mitigate the potential
overbreadth resulting from the use of a negligence standard.
A.
84

The English Courts’ Inherent Jurisdiction

See Devereaux v. Colvin, 844 F. Supp. 1508, 1511–12 (M.D. Fla. 1994)
(explaining that bringing a suit to influence a pending lawsuit draws the Court’s
attention away from more important matters, wastes time, and is therefore
worthy of sanction).
85
See Local 106 v. Homewood Mem’l Gardens, Inc., 838 F.2d 958, 961 (7th
Cir. 1988) (showing that the court will sua sponte sanction a party when they
file an unwarranted motion for sanctions that disregards the existing law that
supports opposition’s defense).
86
See EEOC v. Milavetz and Assocs., 863 F.2d 613, 614 (8th Cir. 1988),
abrogated by NAACP–Special Contribution Fund v. Atkins, 908 F. 2d 336 (8th
Cir. 1990) (quoting what the district court noted and took into consideration in
granting a motion for attorney fees).
87
See Hart, supra note 68 at 105–06 (2002) (arguing that the 1993 amendments
have not reduced the chilling effects of Rule 11); see also Byron C. Keeling,
Toward a Balanced Approach to “Frivolous” Litigation: A Critical Review of
Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1093–
94 (1994) (positing that despite the safe harbor provision in the 1993
amendment to Rule 11, there is still a chilling effect on litigation because there
is no balanced approach).
88
My use of the term “costs” in this section adopts the definition found in Part
43, Rule 43.2(1)(a) of The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 as including “fees,
charges, disbursements, expenses, remuneration, reimbursement allowed to a
litigant in person . . . any additional liability incurred under a funding
arrangement and any fee or reward charged by a lay representative for acting on
behalf of a party in proceedings allocated to the small claims track.” See Civil
Procedure Rules 1998, 1999, S.I. 1998/3132, pt. 43, r. 43.2 (U.K.) (defining the
scope of the term costs).
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Until recent developments discussed below, the English
courts recognized themselves as only having the authority to hold
solicitors, and not barristers, personally responsible for the costs of
an opposing party.89 This authority was derived from the English
courts’ inherent jurisdiction to discipline solicitors and has been
described by the House of Lords as having existed “from time
immemorial.”90 In Myers v Elman,91 the House of Lords
canvassed the history of the courts’ inherent disciplinary
jurisdiction and, specifically, the courts’ authority to order
solicitors to pay costs personally. Although the lords did not settle
on one shared articulation of the appropriate standard to be
applied, they shared the view “that something more serious was
required than mere negligence.”92 Lord Maugham stated that
although “misconduct or default or negligence in the course of the
proceedings”93 may be sufficient to justify an order of costs against
a solicitor personally, the jurisdiction of the court to make such an
order “ought to be exercised only when there has been established
a serious dereliction of duty.”94 Lord Atkin adopted a comparable
position, observing that past case law had treated the courts’
jurisdiction to award costs against solicitors as including instances
of “gross negligence” as well as in cases of “disgraceful” or
“dishonourable” conduct.95 Lord Wright stated that “[a] mere
mistake or error of judgment is not generally sufficient, but a gross
neglect or inaccuracy in a matter which it is a solicitor’s duty to
ascertain with accuracy may suffice.”96 In short, although a
89

See JACKSON & POWELL ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY (Rupert M. Jackson,
John L. Powell & Roger Stewart eds., 6th ed. 2007); see also W. Kent Davis,
The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why Is the United States
the "Odd Man Out" in How It Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
361, 436 n.461 (1999) (citing Moorfield Storey’s statement that the English
Courts may order a lawyer who has engaged in misconduct to pay the opposing
party’s fees, and that this rule has been applied to solicitors).
90
See Myers v. Elman [1940] A.C. 282 302 (U.K.) (acknowledging the power of
judges and the courts to penalize solicitors for misconduct).
91
See id. (highlighting the reasons for applying disciplinary actions towards
solicitors and the consequences caused by their misconduct).
92
See JACKSON & POWELL ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 735 (Rupert M.
Jackson, John L. Powell & Roger Stewart eds., 6th ed. 2007) (discussing the
different positions taken on professional liability by the courts in England since
the eighteenth century).
93
See Myers, supra note 90, at 289 (observing that misconduct, default, or
negligence in the course of a proceeding may justify an order of costs against a
solicitor personally).
94
See id. at 291 (urging that courts impose a personal order of costs against a
solicitor only in cases involving a serious dereliction of duty).
95
See id. at 303–04 (noting that past cases in which courts have awarded costs
against solicitors involved instances of gross negligence or disgraceful conduct).
96
See id. at 319 (opining that gross negligence or inaccuracy may justify
imposition of a personal cost order against a solicitor).
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subjective standard was not articulated in Myers v. Elman, the
House of Lords was careful to distinguish instances in which cost
orders against solicitors would be appropriate from cases of
“ordinary” negligence. As explained by Sachs J. in the subsequent
case of Edwards v. Edwards,97 “the mere fact that the litigation
fails is no reason for invoking the jurisdiction: nor is an error of
judgment: nor even is the mere fact that an error is of an order
which constitutes or is equivalent to negligence.”98 A finding of a
“serious dereliction of duty” was required to ground a wasted costs
order.99
At the time that Myers v. Elman was heard, there were also
statutory provisions in place addressing cost orders against
solicitors. In Myers v. Elman, the House of Lords acknowledged
the applicable Rule of the Supreme Court100—Order 65, rule 11—
as providing “the necessary machinery” for the court’s exercise of
its inherent jurisdiction.101 At the time, Order 65, rule 11 gave a
court the authority to order a solicitor personally liable for costs of
litigation if it appeared to the court that costs had been
“improperly” incurred or wasted as a result of “undue delay” or
“any misconduct or default of the solicitor.”102 Notwithstanding
97

See Edwards v. Edwards [1958] 2 All E.R. 179, 186 (U.K.) (highlighting the
distinction between cases involving the kind of negligence warranting cost
orders against solicitors and those involving ordinary negligence).
98
See id. (profiling which situations do not call for grounding a wasted costs
order).
99
See id. (showing what the House of Lords felt was the standard for grounding
a wasted costs order).
100
Prior to the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules in 1999, the Rules of
the Supreme Court governed procedure in all proceedings in the Supreme Court
in England. These rules fell under the rule-making power of the Supreme Court
Rule Committee, which consisted of the members of the bench and bar. The
term “Supreme Court” referred to the Court of Appeal, the High Court of
Justice, and the Crown Court prior to the establishment of the Supreme Court of
the United Kingdom (the highest appeal court in England) in 2005. These courts
are now referred to as the “Senior Courts of England and Wales.” See PETER ST.
JOHN AND LAWRENCE JOSEPH HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE 14–15 (3rd ed.
1983).
101
See id. at 189 (explaining where the House of Lords believes the court can
exercise its inherent jurisdiction).
102
Order 65, rule 11 specifically provided, inter alia:
If in any case it shall appear to the Court or a judge that costs
have been improperly or without any cause incurred, or that
by reason of any undue delay in proceeding under any
judgment or order, or of any misconduct or default of the
solicitor, any costs properly incurred have nevertheless proved
fruitless to the person incurring the same, the Court or judge
may call on the solicitor of the person by whom such costs
have been so incurred to show cause why such costs should
not be disallowed as between the solicitor and his client, and
also (if the circumstances of the case shall require) why the
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the reference in Order 65, rule 11 to “any misconduct or default of
the solicitor,” the House of Lords in Myers v. Elman chose to adopt
what would appear to be a higher standard, requiring “gross
negligence” or “serious dereliction of duty.”
Order 65, rule 11 was ultimately replaced by a new rule
introduced in 1961, which was amended in turn in 1966. The
revised rule following the 1966 amendments – Order 62, rule 8 –
retained similar language to that contained in Order 65, rule 11.103
The particular language of the rule, however, continued to have
little, if any, impact on the practice of courts. In discussing the
judicial treatment of the Order 62, rule 8 and its predecessor rules,
the Court of Appeal observed that these rules stated in the
commentary contained in successive editions of The Supreme
Court Practice were intended to “provid[e] machinery for the
exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction,” as opposed to being
intended to set out a substantive standard.104 The Court of Appeal
further noted that, consistent with the explanation found in this
commentary, the courts “required that an applicant seeking an
order for costs against a solicitor…prove a serious dereliction of
duty, gross negligence or gross neglect,” regardless of the specific
wording of associated statutory rule in force.105 As a matter of
practice, the Myers v. Elman standard prevailed irrespective of the
statutory provision in place governing the personal liability of
solicitors for the payment of costs.
B.
Beginnings of a Negligence Standard: 1986 Amendments
to the Supreme Court Rules
solicitor should not repay to his client any costs which the
client may have been ordered to pay to any other person, and
thereupon may make such order as the justice of the case may
require.
103

Order 62, rule 8 provided:
Subject to the following provisions of this rule, where in any
proceedings costs are incurred improperly or without
reasonable cause or are wasted by undue delay or by any other
misconduct or default, “the [c]ourt may make against any
solicitor whom it considers to be responsible (whether
personally or through a servant or agent) an order:—
(a) disallowing the costs as between the solicitor and
his client; and
(b) directing the solicitor to repay to his client costs which the
client has been ordered to pay to other parties to the
proceedings; or
(c) directing the solicitor personally to indemnify such other
parties against costs payable by them.”
104
Gupta v. Comer, [1991] 1 Q.B. 629, 631 (appeal taken from Eng.).
105
Id.
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Forty-five years after Myers v. Elman, the case’s hold on
the applicable standard to be applied to wasted costs orders
loosened. In 1986, the Supreme Court Rule Committee replaced
Order 62, rule 8 with Order 62, rule 11.106 The reference in the
rule to “misconduct or default” was deleted and replaced with new
language permitting cost awards if costs had “been wasted by
failure to conduct proceedings with reasonable competence and
expedition.”107 This change to Order 62, rule 11 was part of more
extensive amendments to the costs provisions in Supreme Court
Rules that sought to simplify the taxation of costs and was not the
subject of specific discussion in the commentary that addressed the
broader amendments.108 The notes accompanying Order 62, rule
106

Rules of the Supreme Court (Amendment) 1986, SI 632, s. 11.
The material portions of the new Order 62, rule 11 were as follows:
“Subject to the following provisions of this rule, where it
appears to the court that costs have been incurred
unreasonably or improperly in any proceedings or have been
wasted by failure to conduct proceedings with reasonable
competence and expedition, the court may —
(a) order —
(i) the solicitor whom it considers to be
responsible (whether personally or through
a servant or agent) to repay to his client
costs which the client has been ordered to
pay to any other party to the proceedings; or
(ii) the solicitor personally to indemnify
such other parties against costs payable by
them; and
(iii) the costs as between the solicitor and
his client to be disallowed.”
108
In his Preface to 1988 edition of the Supreme Court Practice, Jack Jacob
reported on developments relating to the Supreme Court Rule that had taken
place since the last edition of the guide that had been published in 1985. In
addressing the changes to the costs regime, he writes:
A major development of exceptional merit and importance has
been the introduction of an entirely new Order 62 relating to
costs, which implements the recommendations of the Working
Party on the Simplification of Taxation….One of the main
objectives of the recommendations was to produce greater
fairness and justice as between the parties who win and those
who lose their cases. The new Order 62 has, as was intended,
greatly simplified the previous basis for the taxation of costs
by providing for only two bases for the orders of costs,
namely, “the standard basis” and “the indemnity basis,” . . .
The revision and restructuring of Order 62 have produced
greater clarity and simplicity and a new freshness in the
complex problems of costs, though no new principle has been
introduced as a matter of general policy in the award of costs
to the successful party.
A summary of the specific changes was reported in the Law Society Gazette at
the time. See New Costs Regime in the Supreme Court, L. Soc’y Gazette, April
30, 1986.
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11 in the 1988 edition of The Supreme Court Practice in which the
amended rule first appeared also failed to register the change as
being of any significance and continued to reference the rule as
being “intended to cover the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.”109
The courts, however, took note of the changed language.
In 1989, the Court of Appeal addressed the new language of Order
62, rule 11 in Sinclair-Jones v. Kay.110 In this case, the plaintiff
had applied for an order that the defendant’s solicitors personally
pay her costs and the court was faced with the question of whether
the “gross misconduct” standard established by Myers v. Elman
should apply to the solicitors’ conduct or whether Order 62, rule 11
established a lesser standard rooted in “reasonable competence and
expedition.”111 In considering this question, May L.J. stated that,
in his opinion, the purpose of the 1986 amendments was to “widen
the court’s powers in cases which properly fall within this rule.”112
Although he did not provide any direct authority for this view,
May L.J. pointed out that the amended rule had also given taxing
masters wider powers to impose costs against solicitors
personally.113 The court held that a standard of “reasonable
competence and expedition” should be applied to applications
under Order 62, rule 11 in accordance with “its ordinary English
meaning”114 and in view of “the circumstances of each case.”115
Although the court in Sinclair-Jones v. Kay did not expressly
articulate a negligence standard, the Court of Appeal has
subsequently characterized the reference to "reasonable
109

SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 965 (Jacob et al. eds.,1988).
See Sinclair-Jones v. Kay [1989] 1 W.L.R. 114, 114–15, 121 (holding that
Order 62, Rule 11 allows for the solicitor to be held financially responsible
despite refraining from gross misconduct, and that case-by-case determination of
whether the costs are reasonable is also required).
111
The facts of this case were that the plaintiff had brought an action against the
defendant claiming rent arrears and damages for breach of a tenancy agreement
and had entered judgment in default after no defense had been served.
Damages were to be assessed at a later hearing. One week after the plaintiff had
entered default judgment, the defendant was granted legal aid to defend the
claim. Seven weeks later and only two days before the damages assessment
hearing, the defendant’s solicitors informed the plaintiff of this development and
the fact that the defendant intended to apply to have the judgment set aside. At
the damages assessment hearing, judgment was granted for the rent arrears but
set aside on the damages claim. The defendant was given leave to amend and no
costs were ordered in relation to the hearing. The plaintiff then applied for an
order that the defendant’s solicitors pay her costs personally. The application
judge dismissed the claim and she appealed to the Court of Appeal.
112
See id. at 121 (discussing that the principles laid in prior case law still apply
despite that the new Order increases the court’s authority).
113
See id.(explaining that only after the rule was amended did the taxing
masters’ powers expand to both substantive and taxation proceedings).
114
See id. at 122.
115
See id. at 121.
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competence" as
negligence.”116

“suggesting

the

ordinary

standard

of

The reasons why the Supreme Court Rules Committee
introduced a negligence standard in Order 62, rule 11 as part of a
set of more extensive amendments to the cost rules are not clear.
Broader developments taking place at the time in relation to the
regulation of the legal profession in England may hold some clues
as to the Committee’s motivations. In 1983, a public scandal had
erupted as a result of the Law Society’s failure to act effectively
against Glanville Davies, a solicitor and a member of the Council
of the Law Society, who had grossly overbilled a client.117 The
litigation that resulted as well as a subsequent review of the
situation by the Law Society had “revealed an appalling catalogue
of errors, insensitivity, and lack of sound judgment on the part of
the Law Society.”118 The failings of Law Society attracted a
significant amount of publicity and, in the view of one
commentator, “led to a complete breakdown of public confidence
in the Law Society’s ability to regulate professional conduct.”119
The “Glanville Davies affair” (as this series of events came to be
called) along with other developments in the mid-1980s—
including the liberalization of restrictions in advertising and the
passage of legislation ending the conveyancing monopoly that
solicitors had previously enjoyed—had placed the English legal
profession under increased scrutiny and generated serious
questions regarding the desirability of permitting the legal
profession to self-regulate.120 Although there is no indication that
the changes to Order 62, rule 11 were a direct response to these
developments, the move to using a negligence standard (and the
attendant increased power given to the courts to monitor and
116

See Ridehalgh v. Horsefield [1994] Ch. 205, 229. It should be noted that a
differently constituted panel of the Court of Appeal criticized the decision in
Sinclair-Jones v. Kay approximately a year and a half later in Holden & Co. v.
Crown Prosecution Service [1990] 2 Q.B. 26. The dispute between the panels in
Sinclair-Jones v. Kay and Holden & Co. v. Crown Prosecution Service,
however, was ultimately short-lived. A year later, the Court of Appeal addressed
the split between the two cases in Gupta v. Comer [1991] 1 Q.B. 629. The
decision ultimately resolved the matter in favor of the approach taken in
Sinclair-Jones v. Kay of adopting the plain language of Order 62, rule 11.
117
The litigation bill at issue was ultimately reduced from £197,000 to £67,000
upon taxation. See generally ROBIN C.A. WHITE, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM
IN ACTION 392 (3rd ed. 1999) (discussing the “Glanville Davies Affair”). See
also MICHAEL BURRAGE, REVOLUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PROFESSION: ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED
STATES 556–57 (2006).
118
See ROBIN C.A. WHITE, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM IN ACTION 392 (3d ed.
1999).
119
See id.
120
See id. at 39293.

94 ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL [Vol. 3, No. 2
& COMPARATIVE LAW
punish lawyer misconduct) is consistent with the broader concerns
that were emerging at the time regarding the profession’s ability to
regulate itself effectively.
Another particular aspect of the broader background that
requires note is a feature of English law not paralleled in the
United States or Canada: “advocates’ immunity” from actions in
negligence. Until recently, both barristers and solicitors in
England were immune from liability arising from the conduct and
management of a case in court.121 This immunity, for example,
precluded a client from bringing an action in negligence against his
or her lawyer in relation to a failure to put a defense to the court or
to call an important witness or in respect of certain conduct that
occurred outside the courtroom, including advice about pre-trial
settlements.122 In the 1969 case Rondel v. Worsley,123 the House of
Lords clarified that this immunity (which had no statutory basis)
was based on public policy. The House of Lords identified three
public policy rationales for the immunity: (a) the administration of
justice required that a barrister be able to carry out his or her duty
to the court fearlessly and independently without the worry of a
potential lawsuit from a client; (b) negligence actions against
barristers would inevitably require retrying the original actions,
which would bring the administration of justice into disrepute by
prolonging litigation and risking inconsistent decisions; and (c)
because a barrister was required to accept any client as a result of
the “cab-rank” rule, it would be unfair “to continue to compel him
to take cases, yet at the same time to remove his independence and
immunity.”124 Although the decision in Rondel v. Worsley only
addressed the immunity granted to barristers, the House of Lords
confirmed that this immunity extended to solicitors also in the
subsequent case of Saif Ali v. Sydney Mitchell & Co.125
Advocates’ immunity was the subject of great criticism
towards the end of the twentieth century and was viewed by some
commentators to be creating an “indefensible” exception in

121

Matthew Groves & Mark Derham, Should Advocates’ Immunity Continue?,
28 MELB. U. L. REV. 80, 81 (2004) (stating that in Arthur J S Hall & Co v.
Simons, the common law doctrine of advocates immunity was abolished).
122
Mary Seneviratne, The Rise and Fall of Advocates’ Immunity, 21 LEGAL
STUDIES 644, 64748 (2001) (detailing the extent of advocates’ immunity in
English courts).
123
See Rondel v. Worsley, [1969] 1 A.C. 191 (upholding immunity for solicitors
and barristers because it is within the public interest to protect counsel).
124
See id. at 276 (listing various public policy interests that are served by
upholding immunity for barristers and solicitors).
125
See Saif Ali v. Sydney Mitchell, [1980] A.C. 198 (clarifying that the
immunity enjoyed by barristers applies equally to solicitors).
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negligence for advocates’ work in court.126 A number of
commentators “called on Parliament to abolish the immunity, on
the grounds that it was outdated and based on flimsy public policy
justifications.”127 The trend in judicial decisions was to interpret
the immunity strictly and to limit its application through narrowing
its scope in relation to pre-trial matters.128 Ultimately, the House
of Lords abolished the doctrine of advocates’ immunity in 2000 in
the “revolutionary”129 case of Arthur J.S. Hall & Co. (a Firm) v.
Simons.130 Although there is no evidence of any direct connection
between the language change to Order 62, rule 11 and the
mounting criticisms at the time of the doctrine of advocates’
immunity, the increased power given to judges to discipline lawyer
conduct through the amendments to Order 62, rule 11 is, once
again, consistent with the larger trend of growing concerns over
the regulation of lawyers in England.
C.
Introduction of an Explicit Negligence Standard:
Revisions to the Supreme Court Act

1991

In 1990, Parliament passed major legislation that sought to
address the concerns that had emerged in relation to the regulation
of the English legal profession. The Courts and Legal Services
Act, 1990131 was the product of several inquiries into the English
legal profession that had culminated in the 1989 release of three
Green Papers132 by Lord Mackay, then Lord Chancellor. Lord
Mackay’s Green Papers were highly critical of the claim of
barristers and solicitors to self-regulation and advocated for free
126

See Mary Seneviratne, The Rise and Fall of Advocates’ Immunity, 21 LEGAL
STUD. 644, 651 (2001) (noting that immunity has been criticized on the grounds
that it does not provide a duty of care to clients).
127
See id. at 650 (accounting for the growing criticism directed at advocates’
immunity in the United Kingdom).
128
See id. at 647–48 (2001); see also Atwell v. Michael Perry & Co., [1998] 4
All E.R. 65 (exemplifying how the courts sought to interpret the advocate’s
immunity strictly by not extending it to giving advice on the prospects of
appeal); see also Dickinson v. Jones Alexander & Co., [1993] 2 FLR 521
(holding that the advocates’ immunity did not extend to matters in relation to a
financial settlement reached after divorce even though the terms of the
settlement were contained in a consent order).
129
See HUGH EVANS, LAWYERS’ LIABILITIES 91 (2002).
130
See Arthur J.S. Hall & Co. v. Simons, [2002] 1 A.C. 615 (abolishing
advocates’ immunity, recognizing an advocate’s duty to not mislead the court).
131
See The Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990 (reforming the way the legal
profession and the court system worked).
132
See Paul D. Paton, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Future of SelfRegulation -- Canada Between the United States and the English/Australian
Experience, 2008 J. PROF. LAW 87, 99 n.56 (2008) (explaining that green papers
represent the first consideration by the British government of concepts for new
legislation, and are followed by a period of debate and deliberation, eventually
leading to the introduction of legislation).
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competition among legal services providers and for state
supervision of the bar’s complaints and disciplinary procedures.133
As summarized by Michael Burrage, “[the Green Papers] heralded
the end of sovereign, self-governing professions and triumphantly
proclaimed that market principles were henceforth to govern the
provision of legal services.”134 The Green Papers prompted an
intensely negative reaction from the bench and bar. 135 Ultimately,
the resulting White Paper that became law as the Courts and Legal
Services Act, 1990 “backed away from the more radical proposals
for reform” and “was a comparatively modest measure.”136 The

133

For a more detailed discussion of the contents of the Green Papers, see
WHITE, supra note 117, at 395–398; see also BURRAGE, supra note 117 at 558–
60 (explaining the green papers’ position that the legal field is not entitled to
self-regulation); see also Michael Zander, The Legal Services Act 2007: An Act
of Revolution for the Legal Profession, LEGAL SERVICES INSTITUTE 1, 3 (2011)
(detailing the radical reforms of the green papers).
134
See BURRAGE, supra note 117, at 559 (emphasizing the green papers’
fundamental arguments).
135
See id. at 560–61 (detailing the bar’s public campaign against the green
papers, which included an extensive advertising campaign, protest meetings, and
press conferences); see also Judith L. Maute, Revolutionary Changes to the
English Legal Profession or Much Ado about Nothing? 17 THE PROFESSIONAL
LAWYER 1, 7 (2006) (discussing the green papers and their negative reception).
136
PATON, supra note 132, at 99 (noting that the Courts and Legal Services Act
of 1990 was a modest effort because it eliminated the more radical proposals
that were criticized as an apparent intrusion of government onto the English
legal system). Judith Maute summarizes the changes from Green Papers to the
White Paper as follows:
Three months later a new set of White Papers signaled retreat
from the Government's original radical stance. The
professional bodies mostly would retain their traditional
controls prohibiting barrister partnerships, direct access to
clients, multidisciplinary partnerships, and recognition of
specialties. Rights of audience remained unchanged for
practical purposes, but with the understanding that statutory
bars against solicitors would be repealed. Proposals to allow
contingency fees were dropped altogether. The professional
bodies would continue to make the rules of conduct and
training regarding advocacy and litigation, but they would
now require approval of the Lord Chancellor. Where the
Green Papers conferred on the Lord Chancellor strong
regulatory powers over professional codes of conduct, rights
of audience and specialization certification, the White Papers
proposed legislation defining general principles applicable to
these areas. They retained some less controversial aspects of
the Green Papers, such as ending Solicitors' monopoly on
conveyancing, and creating the Legal Services Ombudsman.
Both professional branches opposed the White Papers' stance
on rights of audience; the Law Society bemoaned them as too
little, and the Bar decried them as too much. (footnotes
omitted).
Maute, supra note 135, at 5.
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act, consisting of 125 sections and spanning 201 pages,137 dealt
with procedure in civil courts,138 the regulation of legal services,139
qualification for judicial office,140 and the rules governing
arbitrations.141
The Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 also changed the
courts’ wasted costs jurisdiction. Section 51 of the Supreme Court
Act was revised, effective October 1991, and introduced an
explicit negligence standard:
51(6) In any proceedings mentioned in subsection (1),142
the court may disallow, or (as the case may be) order the
legal or other representative concerned to meet, the whole
of any wasted costs or such part of them as may be
determined in accordance with rules of court.
51(7) In subsection (6), “wasted costs” means any costs
incurred by a party—
(a) as a result of any improper, unreasonable or
negligent act or omission on the part of any legal or
other representative or any employee of such a
representative; or
(b) which, in the light of any such act or omission
occurring after they were incurred, the court
considers it is unreasonable to expect that party to
pay.143
137

ROBIN C.A. WHITE, A GUIDE TO THE COURTS AND LEGAL SERVICES ACT 11
(1991).
138
These changes included rule changes relating to the liberalization of rights of
audience and rules governing evidence.
139
Major reforms in this area included extending rights of audience in higher
courts to solicitors as well as the creation of the Legal Services Ombudsman.
140
See ROBIN C.A. WHITE, A GUIDE TO THE COURTS AND LEGAL SERVICES ACT
15 (1991) (observing that as a result of extending rights of audience and the
right to conduct litigation, the exclusion of anyone except barristers from higher
judicial office was no longer considered to be justified; accordingly, the Act
introduced provisions “[tying] eligibility for judicial appointment to the holding
for specified periods of time, of an advocacy qualification”).
141
Including increased powers given to arbitrators to dismiss claims or counterclaims in circumstances where there has been “inordinate and inexcusable
delay.”
142
Subsection 1 refers to proceedings in the civil division of the Court of
Appeal, the High Court and any county court.
143
Note that Order 61, rule 11 was amended to supplement the new section 51
of the Supreme Court Act, but was ultimately replaced by Section 48.7 of the
Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”) in 1999. Section 48.7 of the CPR (which
remains in force) does not articulate a substantive standard with respect to the
courts’ exercise of wasted costs jurisdiction, but rather outlines the procedures
applicable in cases in which the court “is considering whether to make an order
under section 51(6) of the Supreme Court Act 1981.” Among the provisions is a
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The inclusion of the language in section 51(7) referring to “any
improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission” resolved that
negligence was sufficient to give rise to a wasted costs order. The
reference to “legal or other representatives”144 in Section 51(6)
extended the court’s wasted costs jurisdiction to barristers in
addition to solicitors.
The White Paper, Legal Services: A Framework for the
Future,145 which formed the basis for the legislation, mentions the
proposed changes to costs orders only very briefly, noting that the
government was proposing that the “existing rule which enables
some courts to order that a solicitor should personally bear any part
of the costs of the an action, where his work has fallen short of the
standards of competence the court expects” should be extended to
include all advocates as well as magistrates’ courts.146 In contrast
to this relative silence in the official literature, there is some
indication that the legal profession was not happy with the move to
an explicit negligence standard. An article published in August
1990 in the Law Society Gazette reported that “[t]he Law Society
is furious that the clause has been inserted without proper
consultation or discussion” and was concerned about a new broad
and uncertain standard being applied to lawyer conduct under the
wasted costs jurisdiction.147
The leading case on the application of wasted costs orders
under section 51 is Ridehalgh v. Horsefield,148 in which the Court
of Appeal in 1994 consolidated six appeals, all addressing the
requirement that the lawyer be given a reasonable opportunity to attend a
hearing and dispute the appropriateness of a wasted costs order against him.
Additional guidance is provided by a Practice Direction that accompanies
Section 48.7 of the CPR that, among other things, affirms the court’s ability to
make a wasted costs order on its own initiative.
144
The phase “legal or other representatives” is defined in turn in section 51(13)
of the Supreme Court Act as meaning “any person exercising a right of
audience or right to conduct litigation on his behalf.”
145
See DEPARTMENT OF THE LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR, LEGAL SERVICES: A
FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE 1989, Cm. 749 (U.K) (indicating that the White
paper formed the basis for the proposed changes regarding wasted costs).
146
See id. (describing the past rule which held that an attorney would bear the
burden of paying for his own services if his services were deemed to fall below
the expected standard).
147
See New Clause Angers Society, LAW SOC. GAZ. (Aug. 22, 1990),
http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/new-clause-angers-society (detailing the Law
Society’s concern that the new wasted costs direction would create the
imposition of new and uncertain standards upon lawyer conduct).
148
See Ridehalgh, [1994] A.C. at 205 (noting that the decision rules on six
appeals determining the circumstances under which the court should order one
party to pay the litigation costs of the opposing party).
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circumstances in which a wasted costs order should be made. In
Ridehalgh, Lord Bingham considered the appropriate interpretation
of the terms “improper, unreasonable and negligent” as used in
section 51 of the Supreme Court Act. Of the three terms, he
deemed “negligent” as being the “most controversial.”149 In
considering the meaning of “negligent” in the context of section
51, Lord Bingham held that “‘negligent’ should be understood in
an untechnical way to denote failure to act with the competence
reasonably to be expected of ordinary members of the
profession.”150 He further clarified that a finding of negligence in
the context of a wasted costs order did not require a finding that
there had been “an actionable breach of the legal representative’s
duty to his own client.”151 Nevertheless, Lord Bingham cautioned
that an applicant for a wasted costs order under the negligence arm
of section 51 was required to establish the same elements that a
plaintiff would be required to establish in an action for
negligence,152 including demonstrating a “causal link” between the
impugned behavior and the costs that are said to have been wasted.
Lord Bingham also addressed the relationship between the
doctrine of advocates’ immunity, which had yet to be abolished,
and the negligence standard articulated in section 51. After noting
the apparent incongruity between the common law doctrine and the
newly established statutory rule, he concluded that “the intention
of this legislation is to encroach on the traditional immunity of the
advocate by subjecting him to the wasted costs jurisdiction if he
causes a waste of costs by improper, unreasonable or negligent
conduct.”153 Lord Bingham further noted that “[i]t is our belief,
which we cannot substantiate, that part of the reason underlying
the changes effected by the new section 51 was judicial concern at
the wholly unacceptable manner in which a very small minority of
barristers conducted cases in court.”154
In 2003, the House of Lords endorsed the interpretation
given in Ridehalgh to section 51 in Medcalf v. Mardell.155
Although the allegations in Medcalf involved accusations of
149

See id. at 232 (interpreting the 1990 Act’s usage of the term).
See id. at 233 (providing a new interpretation of the term “negligent”).
151
See id. at 232 (rejecting the old interpretation).
152
For example, an error "such as no reasonably well-informed and competent
member of that profession could have made.” Id. at 233 (citing Saif Ali v Sydney
Mitchell & Co. [1980] A.C. 198 at 218, 220) (reminding potential applicants of
their burden of proof).
153
See Ridehalgh, [1994] A.C. at 205, 236.
154
See id. (explaining that the intention of the legislation is to limit the
traditional immunity of the advocate if the advocate causes a waste by improper
conduct).
155
See Medcalf v. Mardell, [2003] 1 A.C. 120 (expanding the scope of the
wasted costs doctrine to cover the factual situation present).
150
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intentional misconduct and not negligence, Lord Hobhouse
discussed the use of the term “negligence” at some length,
commenting that:
The word negligent raises additional problems of
interpretation….[I]t would appear that the inclusion
of the word negligent in substitution for "reasonable
competence", is directed primarily to the
jurisdiction as between a legal representative and
his own client. It is possible to visualise situations
where the negligence of an advocate might justify
the making of a wasted costs order which included
both parties, such as where an advocate fails to turn
up on an adjourned hearing so that a hearing date is
lost. The breach of the advocate's duty to the court
will be clear and if the breach was not deliberate,
the term negligent would best describe it.156
Insofar as Lord Hobhouse states that the term “negligent” in the
statute is “directed primarily to the jurisdiction as between a legal
representative and his own client,” he departs from the general
tenor of past judicial interpretation which articulated the wasted
cost jurisdiction as focused on the duty owed by the lawyer to the
court and as not being predicated upon “an actionable breach of the
legal representative's duty to his own client.”157
In the first decade following the introduction of a
negligence standard in section 51, approximately 75 cases applying
the section were reported.158 Among the circumstances in which
the English courts have made wasted cost orders are cases in which
the lawyer: pursued a misconceived appeal against an arbitrator’s
decision;159 failed to realize that an attempt to wind up a company

156

See id. at 143 (opining that negligence is a theory of liability that exists in the
advocate-client relationship).
157
For example, in Ridehalgh, Lord Bingham held that a wasted costs order
under section 51’s negligence arm was not dependent on the finding that a
lawyer breached a duty to this client and, indeed, “since the applicant's right to a
wasted costs order against a legal representative depends on showing that the
latter is in breach of his duty to the court it makes no sense to superimpose a
requirement under this head (but not in the case of impropriety or
unreasonableness) that he is also in breach of his duty to his client.” See also
Myers v. Elman [1940] AC 282, 291 (Lord Maugham as articulating the
operative duty as a “duty to the court”).
158
See EVANS, supra note 129 at 127 n.6.
159
See Fletamentos Maritimos SA v. Effjohn Int’l SA, [2003] Lloyd’s Rep. P.N.
26 (criticizing the lawyer’s appeal and ordering a wasted cost penalty).
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was inappropriate;160 failed to disclose to the Court in an
application for a Mareva injunction that the client was in fact
bankrupt;161 issued proceedings to commit for a breach of an
undertaking without warning, in circumstances where the breach at
issue was merely technical;162 and failed to attend an appeal
because of wrong information given to the lawyer by the lawyer’s
clerk.163 The scope of the English courts’ jurisdiction under
section 51 is broader that of the American courts’ under Rule 11
because the later provision is limited to misconduct in relation to
the filing of litigation papers and does not extend to misconduct in
the course of litigation generally.
D.

English Safeguards: An Exception for Hopeless Cases

Although they endorsed a “plain meaning” interpretation of
the negligence arm of section 51, the courts in Ridehalgh and
Medcalf each expressed concern about certain tensions that they
viewed to be inherent in the wasted costs jurisdiction. In
Ridehalgh, the Court of Appeal identified a tension arising
between the public interest inhering in lawyers not being “deterred
from pursuing their clients' interests by fear of incurring a personal
liability to their clients' opponents”164 and “the other public
interest…that litigants should not be financially prejudiced by the
unjustifiable conduct of litigation by their or their opponents'
lawyers.”165 The House of Lords in Medcalf noted a different
tension in the form of a “risk of a conflict of interest for the

160

See Re a Company (No. 0022 of 1993), [1993] B.C.C. 726 (1993) (holding
that the company’s solicitors should be subject to a wasted cost order for
inappropriately attempting to wind up the company).
161
See Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. de Montenegro, [1994] N.P.C. 46 (1994)
(finding that the attorney’s failure to disclose pertinent information warranted a
wasted cost order).
162
See R. v. Liverpool City Council, [1994] C.O.D. 144 (1993) (penalizing the
solicitors with a wasted cost order for bringing an action based on a technical
breach).
163
See R. v. Rodney, [1997] P.N.L.R. 489, 489-90 (1996) (ordering a wasted
cost penalty to be levied upon the lawyer for the failure to attend an appeal
proceeding).
164
See Ridehalgh, [1994] A.C. at 205 at 226. The Court of Appeal noted three
additional interests for lawyers: “that [lawyers] should not be penalised by
orders to pay costs without a fair opportunity to defend themselves; that wasted
costs orders should not become a back-door means of recovering costs not
otherwise recoverable against a legally-aided or impoverished litigant; and that
the remedy should not grow unchecked to become more damaging than the
disease.”
165
See id. at 226 (noting that although lawyers should pursue their clients’
interests without fear of personal liability, there is also an interest in protecting
litigants from wasted costs).
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advocate” between his or her duties to a client and to the court.166
As observed by Lord Hobhouse, “ideally a conflict should not
arise” because “[t]he advocate's duty to his own client is subject to
his duty to the court: the advocate's proper discharge of his duty to
his client should not cause him to be accused of being in breach of
his duty to the court.”167 Notwithstanding this “ideal” congruence,
Lord Hobhouse expressed concern that the circumstances in which
a lawyer may, in fact, find himself or herself in litigation will not
always be “so clear-cut”:
Difficult tactical decisions may have to be made,
maybe in difficult circumstances. Opinions can
differ, particularly in the heated and stressed arena
of litigation. Once an opposing party is entitled to
apply for an order against the other party's legal
representatives, the situation becomes much more
unpredictable and hazardous for the advocate.
Adversarial perceptions are introduced. . . . The
factors which may motivate a hostile application by
an opponent are liable to be very different from
those which would properly motivate a court.168
The English courts have introduced one major substantive
safeguard to the “negligence” arm of the wasted costs jurisdiction
through an exception for “hopeless cases.” In Ridehalgh, the
English Court of Appeal considered the issue of “hopeless cases”
and held that “[a] legal representative is not to be held to have
acted improperly, unreasonably, or negligently simply because he
acts for a party who pursues a claim or a defence which is plainly
doomed to fail.”169 The House of Lords echoed this sentiment in
Medcalf, commenting that “it is not enough that the court considers
that the advocate has been arguing a hopeless case” and that “to
penalise the advocate for presenting his client's case to the court
would be contrary to . . . constitutional principles.”170 Although
there has been some disagreement in the case law at to whether this
judicially created exception for “hopeless cases” requires
“something more than negligence for the wasted costs jurisdiction
166

See Medcalf, [2003] 1 A.C. at 142 (detailing how the wasted costs
jurisdiction affects lawyers’ duties).
167
See id. (examining why conflicts should not arise for lawyers in most
circumstances).
168
See id (noting the situations in which a lawyer’s duties to the client and court
are not aligned).
169
See Ridehalgh, [1994] A.C. at 233 (explaining that reproaching barristers for
representing clients who pursue hopeless cases may have the negative effect of
limiting reputable representation for those clients).
170
See Medcalf, [2003] 1 A.C. 120 at 143 (Eng.) (stating that it is the duty of
advocates to present their clients’ cases, even if they are hopeless).
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to arise” in the form of a finding of an abuse of process, this
dispute appears to have resolved itself in favor of continuing with
the “plain meaning” interpretation given to the term “negligent” in
Ridehalgh.171
Notwithstanding the safeguard introduced through the
judicial exception for “hopeless cases,” several English
commentators have expressed concern about the exercise of the
courts’ wasted costs jurisdiction under section 51. Hugh Evans has
argued that “in both practice and principle, the wasted costs
jurisdiction is seriously flawed.”172 One of Evans’ complaints is
that the cost of a wasted costs application is often far more than the
actual wasted costs at stake.173 Having surveyed the case law up to
171

In Persaud v. Persaud, [2003], EWCA (Civ) 394 [26]–[27] (Eng.), the Court
of Appeal reviewed the comments of the courts with respect to the pursuit of
hopeless cases in Ridehalgh and Medcalf and accepted the submission of
counsel for the respondents “that there must be something more than negligence
for the wasted costs jurisdiction to arise: there must be something akin to an
abuse of process if the conduct of the legal representative is to make him liable
to a wasted costs order.” However, soon after Persaud, the Court of Appeal
stepped back from these comments in the case of Dempsey v. Johnstone, [2003]
EWCA (Civ) 1134 (Eng.). In Dempsey, Latham L.J. concluded that Ridehalgh
and Medcalf could not be viewed reasonably as modifying the understanding of
the term “negligent” articulated in Ridehalgh, although Latham L.J.
acknowledged that finding that a legal representative was negligent, and thereby
acted unreasonably was “akin to establishing an abuse of process.” See
Dempsey, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1134 [28] (Eng.). In general, courts in
subsequent cases have chosen to follow the approach in Dempsey as opposed to
following a strict reading of the comments in Persaud that negligent conduct is
not sufficient for the court’s wasted costs jurisdiction to arise. See, e.g., Morris
v. Roberts [2005] EWHC (Ch) 1040 [52] (Eng.) (observing that “a legal
representative will also be liable to a wasted costs order if, exercising the
objective professional judgment of a reasonably competent solicitor, he ought
reasonably to have appreciated that the litigation in which he was acting,
constituted an abuse of process” and noting that the “stricter test” set out in
Persaud “is no longer the law”); see also Isaacs P’ship v. Umm Al-Jawaby Oil
Serv. Co. Ltd., [2003] EWHC (QB) 2539 [25] (Eng.) (noting that “the
authorities do not warrant the conclusion that ‘negligence’ on its own is
insufficient for the making of a wasted costs order”); see also Hedrich v.
Standard Bank London Ltd., [2007] EWHC (QB) 1656 [12] (Eng.) (agreeing
with the approach taken in Morris to adopt the approach in Demspey as opposed
to Persaud). But see, Patel v. Air India Ltd., [2010] EWCA (Civ) 443 [15]
(Eng.) (stating that in order to attract the courts’ wasted costs jurisdiction, “not
only must the claim be hopeless but there must be a breach of duty to the court,
that being a breach by the solicitors of their duty to the court . . . or, as it has
been put in other authorities such as Persaud v Persaud [2003] EWCA Civ 394,
there must be something akin to an abuse of the process of the court”).
172
See HUGH EVANS, LAWYERS’ LIABILITIES 127 (2d ed. 2002) (exploring the
defects of the wasted costs jurisdiction through analysis of reported cases
affected by the jurisdiction).
173
See id at 128–32 (2d ed. 2002) (analyzing specific cases which exhibit the
exorbitant cost of wasted cost applications).
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2002, he reports that he “found no reported case where it is clear
that the costs incurred in the wasted costs application were justified
by the amount of wasted costs sought or recovered.”174 Adrian
Zuckerman has echoed Evans’ concern, commenting that “the
jurisdiction has given rise to a new type of satellite litigation,
which can be expensive and wholly out of proportion to the costs
that can be recovered from the lawyer or, indeed, to the costs of the
substantive proceedings.”175
III.

CANADA

In Canada, as in the United States and England, the courts
possess an inherent jurisdiction as well as statutory authority to
require lawyers to pay personally the costs of an opposing party.176
As in the United States and England, the law in Canada has moved
towards the adoption of a negligence standard in recent decades
and has employed various statutory and judicial safeguards to
temper the effect of this standard.
A.

The Canadian Courts’ Inherent Jurisdiction

Historically, Canadian courts explicitly followed the House
of Lords’ 1940 decision in Myers v. Elman in cases concerning the
courts’ inherent jurisdiction to require a lawyer to pay personally
the litigation costs of an opposing party.177 However, in the 1993
174

See id at 129 (2d ed. 2002) One example given by Evans is the case of Re a
Company (No. 006798 of 1995) [1996] 1 W.L.R. 491 wherein a petition to wind
up a company was struck out within a day, but the subsequent petition and
application for wasted costs from the solicitor who swore the affidavit in support
of the petition “appears to have taken all or part of four days”.
175
See ADRIAN A.S. ZUCKERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 966 (2003).
176
See Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3. (Can.) (explaining that Canadian
courts have authority under statute and their inherent jurisdiction to award costs
to the successful party); see, e.g., MANITOBA LAW REFORM COMM’N, COSTS
AWARDS IN CIVIL LITIG. REPORT #111 8 (2005),
http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/mlrc/reports/111.pdf (discussing that in the
Canadian province of Manitoba, the court has the discretion to award the
successful party costs against the unsuccessful party).
177
See Paul Perell, Ordering a Solicitor Personally to Pay Costs, 25 ADVOC. Q.
103, 104 (2001). See, for example, the Ontario Court of Appeal’s comments in
Re Ontario Crime Commission, [1962] O.R. 872 (Can.) whereby the court
ordered a lawyer to personally pay costs where he had knowingly filed a false
affidavit of a client. In so ordering, the court held:
It is no answer for counsel to say that he was merely carrying
out his client’s instructions. If the instructions are to do that
which is wrong, counsel is abetting the wrong if he carries out
the instructions. If he knows that his client is making false
statements under oath and does nothing to correct it his silence
indicates, at the very least, a gross neglect of duty. Regardless
of any other sanctions which may be imposed upon him, there
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decision of Young v. Young,178 the Supreme Court of Canada
departed from this tradition to some extent. Writing for the
majority on this issue, Justice McLachlin (as she then was)
considered the authority of the court to order a lawyer to pay costs
personally and held that “[a]ny member of the legal profession
might be subject to a compensatory order for costs if it is shown
that repetitive and irrelevant material, and excessive motions and
applications, characterized the proceedings in which [they] were
involved, and that the lawyer acted in bad faith in encouraging this
abuse and delay.”179 Although the Supreme Court made no
reference to Myers v. Elman in this case, the Court did approve of
the lower court’s conclusion that the conduct of the lawyer in
question had not been sufficiently egregious to justify an award of
costs against him. In reaching this conclusion, the lower court had
relied on Myers v. Elman and had discussed the House of Lord’s
comments in that case at some length.
Justice McLachlin’s
reference to a lawyer having “acted in bad faith,” however,
suggested a departure from Myers v. Elman standard under which
only “gross negligence” or a “serious dereliction of duty” is
will be an order that counsel for the applicant personally pay
the costs of all other parties appearing on this motion. Such an
order may be exceptional but in our view is justified by the
circumstances outlined. In Myers v. Elman, [1940] A.C. 282,
Lord Wright discussed the principles for the making of the
order as to costs which has just been made….
Following this passage, the court proceeded to quote from Lord Wright’s speech
in Myers v. Elman including his statement that “a mere mistake or error of
judgment is not generally sufficient [for the court’s exercise of its inherent
disciplinary authority], but a gross neglect or inaccuracy in a matter which it is a
solicitor's duty to ascertain with accuracy may suffice.” A number of other
Canadian courts have also explicitly relied on Myers v. Elman as support for the
authority that the court has the inherent jurisdiction to order lawyers to
personally pay costs. See, e.g., Boland Foundation v. Moog, [1963] O.J. No. 314
(C.A.); Re: Fisher and the Queen, (1977) 78 D.L.R. (3d) 215 (Fed. C.A.);
Pacific Mobile Corp. v. Hunter Douglas Ltd., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 842; Blair v.
Levesque, (1990) 108 N.B.R. (2d) 171; Perley v. Sypher, (1990) 109 N.B.R.
(2d) 427 (N.B. C.A.); First National Bank of Oregon v. Watson (A.H.) Ranching
Ltd., 1984 A.R. LEXIS 3761 (Alta. Q.B. 1984); Petten et al. v. E.Y.E. Marine
Consultants et al., 1998 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. LEXIS 441 (Nfld. S.C. 1998); Blair v.
Ouellette et al. (1990), 108 N.B.R.(2d) 171; Royal Bank of Canada v.
Kwiatkowski et al., 1989 Sask. R. LEXIS 822 (Sask. Q.B. 1989). Notably, the
Supreme Court of Canada directly approved of Myers v. Elman in its brief
judgment in Pacific Mobile Corp. v. Hunter Douglas Canada Ltd. [1979] 1
S.C.R. 842, stating that in the circumstances of the case, “the Court should make
use of its power to order costs payable by solicitors personally, in accordance
with principles which were fully stated by the House of Lords in Myers v.
Elman, and need not be restated here.”
178
[1993] 4 S.C.R. 3. (Can.).
179
See Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, 17 (Can.) [hereinafter Young]
(ruling that no order of costs should have been made against respondent’s
attorney).
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required. The issue of whether Justice McLachlin intended to
depart from Myers v. Elman in Young v. Young does not appear to
be the subject of any discussion in subsequent case law or in the
academic literature. Following Young v. Young, a number of
Canadian courts cited Justice McLachlin’s comments as having
established the proposition that the exercise of the courts’ inherent
jurisdiction to award costs against lawyers personally did require a
finding of “bad faith.”180 In any event, as in the United States and
England, Canadian courts now generally order costs against
lawyers personally on the basis of statutory provisions rather than
on the basis of the courts’ inherent jurisdiction.
B.

Ontario’s Introduction of a Negligence Standard

In Canada, provincial legislatures have jurisdiction over the
administration of civil justice and, accordingly, rules of civil
procedure are established on a provincial basis. In what follows, I
examine the statutory developments in one Canadian jurisdiction,
Ontario. The first relevant statutory provision in Ontario was
introduced in 1985 as part of comprehensive reforms to Ontario’s
Civil Procedure rules.181 Although “a key objective of the reforms
was to ensure full, early disclosure of facts and evidence in order
to identify the contentious issues in a lawsuit and to promote
settlement,”182 the reforms introduced changes to a wide range of
civil procedure rules including provisions addressing the costs of
litigation.183

180

See Schwisberg v. Krieger & Assocs. (1997) 33 O.R. 3d 256 (Can. Ont.
C.A.); see also Marchand v. Pub. Gen. Hosp. Soc’y of Chatham [1998] O.J. No.
527 at para. 179 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.) (opining that an award for costs does not
require a finding of bad faith); see also Markdale Ltd. v. Ducharme (1998) 238
A.R. 98 (Alta. Q.B.). More recently, in R. v. Cunningham [2010] 1 S.C.R. 331,
350 (Can.) the Supreme Court of Canada made reference to a bad faith standard
being established in Young, [1993] 4 S. C. R. 3. (Can.) noting in passing that
“McLachlin J. in Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, at pp. 135-36,
acknowledged that a court can award costs against counsel personally in rare
cases where counsel acts in bad faith by encouraging abuse and delay of the
court's process.”
181
The reforms, contained in the newly promulgated Rules of Civil Procedure,
were drafted by a Rules Committee created by statute and subject to legislative
approval before coming into force.
182
See MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT ON THE TASK FORCE ON
DISCOVERY PROCESS (2003), available at
http://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/en/reports/discoveryreview/
executivesummary.htm (listing objectives of reforms to the Rules).
183
See generally John Morden, An Overview of the Rules of Civil Procedure of
Ontario, 5 ADVOC. Q. 257, 259–61 (1984) (reviewing all of the procedural
provisions introduced by the Rules).
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In particular, the newly introduced Rule 57.07 explicitly
provided that a lawyer could be personally liable for costs in
certain circumstances. As introduced in 1985, Rule 57.07 read:
57.07 (1) Where a solicitor for a party has caused
costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or to
be wasted by undue delay, negligence or other
default, the court may make an order,
(a) disallowing costs between the solicitor
and client or directing the solicitor to repay
to the client money paid on account of costs;
(b) directing the solicitor to reimburse the
client for any costs that the client has been
ordered to pay to any other party; and
(c) requiring the solicitor to personally to
pay the costs of any party.
(2) An order under subrule (1) may be made by the
court on its own initiative or on the motion of any
party to the proceeding, but no such order shall be
made unless the solicitor is given a reasonable
opportunity to make representations to the court.
(3) The court may direct that notice of an order
against a solicitor under subrule (1) be given to the
client in the manner specified in the order.
The term “lawyer” replaced the term “solicitor” in the rule as part
of an omnibus change in terminology in the Rules of Civil
Procedure in 2007.
At the time of its introduction, Rule 57.07 was “entirely
new” and members of the profession expressed concern about its
potential effects.185 Within weeks of Rule 57.07 coming into
184

184

See David W. Scott, Costs and the Rules of Civil Procedure, in NEW RULES
12-2 (1984). Note that, under the previous rules that were
in place, the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court of Ontario,
there were certain circumstances under which lawyers might be held personally
accountable for costs notwithstanding the fact that the rules did not make
specific provisions for this to happen. See United Van Lines Ltd. v. Petrov,
[1975] 13 O.R. 2d 479 (providing an example where costs against a lawyer were
awarded by courts where a lawyer certified a clearly frivolous claim under Rule
33(4), which authorized the special endorsement of writs of summons with a
statement of claim where the plaintiff had sought to recover a debt or a
liquidated demand in money).
185
The comments of David W. Scott, a senior practitioner in Ontario, reflect a
number of the profession’s concerns at the time:
The somewhat troubling area [of the new changes to the civil
procedure rules], insofar as this practitioner is concerned,
flows from the recent history of the relationship between
Bench and Bar in Ontario as the threshold against which the
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
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force, one Ontario lawyer brought an application for a declaration
that the rule was of no force and effect on several grounds,
including the rule’s purported attack on the independence of the
bar as well as the rule’s alleged violation of certain constitutional

provisions of Rule 57.07 were developed. The preoccupation
of the Courts with the management of “its” caseload in terms
of the expeditious resolution of disputes has resulted in a
tendancy [sic], from time to time, to transfer to counsel
involved the responsibility for what are perceived as
unnecessary proceedings, delays or prolongation of trials. As
counsel, one has the temerity to think that, from time to time,
Her Majesty’s Judges are somewhat forgetful of the
responsibility for, and the process of dealing with, litigants
determined to enforce their rights in increasingly complex
matters. It would be well to remind ourselves of the
demanding obligation which counsel has to his or her client.
The Rules of Professional Conduct in Ontario include the
principle generally accepted in England that:
“a Barrister has a duty to his client fearlessly
to raise every issue, advance every argument
and ask every question, however distasteful,
which he properly may and which he thinks
will help his client’s case, without regard to
any unpleasant consequences to himself or
any other person” (emphasis added)
(Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Ed., Vol.
3, ¶1137)
While this obligation is coupled with an overriding duty to the
Court and to the public it is of such significance to the overall
administration of justice that, within appropriately defined
limits, counsel must be able to approach this responsibility
with singlemindededness…
The fact that a significant portion of the relief encompassed by Rule
57.07 was available in the ordinary exercise of the Court’s
extraordinary discretion is beside the point. The codification of this
relief is, I would suggest, ominous. It is not a rule which will give
much pause to the experienced practitioner. The inexperienced
members of the Bar are another matter. How many times have we all,
in our developing years, agonized over claims to make, issues to raise,
lines of questioning to develop, as part of our responsibilities to our
clients in the framework of our roles as officers of the Court? Will this
process, in the hands of the young lawyer, be encouraged to the
advantage of the client if the sword of Rule 57.07 hangs over counsel’s
head as a backdrop against which the strategy of presenting the client’s
case is developed. It is not unlikely that codification and expansion of
this drastic remedy may serve to intimidate the responsible lawyer
more than the reverse.
(Scott, supra note 184 at 12-8 to 12-9).
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rights.186 This application ultimately made its way to the Supreme
Court of Canada, which upheld a lower court’s decision to quash
the application on the basis that the applicant had failed to put
forward any evidence that the impugned rules violated provisions
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.187 The hostility
to Rule 57.07 among the legal profession is reflected in the
Supreme Court’s decision: Justice Sopinka noted in the opening
paragraph of his reasons that Rule 57.07 was “known colloquially
among the Ontario Bar as the “Torquemada Rule,” referencing
“the first grand inquisitor of the Spanish Inquisition whose name
has become synonymous with cruelty.”188
C.

Initial Resistance to a Negligence Standard

Notwithstanding the explicit negligence standard in Rule
57.07, courts were initially divided over the question of whether
more than “mere negligence” was required before an order of costs
against a lawyer could be made under the provision. One line of
authority viewed the rule as codifying the doctrine in Myers v.
Elman requiring serious misconduct (and thereby precluding an
order for cases of “mere negligence”). A contrasting line of
authority advocated for a plain reading of the rule’s language and
awarded costs against lawyers where lawyers had been found to
have ‘caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or to be
wasted by undue delay, negligence or other default.’189
Exemplifying the first line of authority, Justice Sutherland held in
the 1987 case of Cini v. Micaleff190 that “[a]lthough rule 57.07 is
worded in such a way as to make it appear that it would be
applicable as a compensatory matter in cases of mere negligence, it
is clear that the thrust of the decided cases is such that something
more than mere negligence is required.”191 On this basis, Justice
Sutherland declined to award costs against the lawyers who had
added a corporate plaintiff to an action at the opening of trial
despite the fact that, unknown to the lawyers, the corporate
plaintiff had been dissolved and, as such, could not have
authorized the claim in its name. Following Cini v. Micaleff, a
186

See Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General) [1985], 51 O.R. 2d 405 (Can. Ont.,
H.C.J.) (discussing whether a lawyer had standing to challenge legislation which
imposed penalties on lawyers filing frivolous lawsuits).
187
See Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086 (Can.)
(explaining that a solicitor will be responsible for costs when they cause costs to be
incurred without reasonable cause or wasted by undue delay, negligence or other
default).
188
See id. (emphasizing that many lawyers felt that new civil procedure rules
assessing costs against lawyers in certain circumstances were cruel).
189
Perell, supra note 177 at 105.
190
(1987), 60 O.R. (2d ) 584 (H.C.J.).
191
Id. at 609.
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number of other cases in Ontario held that conduct on the part of
the lawyer needed to amount to something more than “mere
negligence” before costs will be awarded under Rule 57.07.192 A
division in the case law emerged, however, when Justice Haines in
the 1994 case of Worsley v. Lichong193 rejected the proposition
articulated in Cini v. Micaleff that more than “mere negligence”
was required and instead held that the “straightforward” language
in the rule should be given its “ordinary meaning.”194
The division in the case law that had emerged was
considered at length by Justice Granger in Marchand v. Public
General Hospital Society of Chatham.195 After reviewing both the
Canadian and English authorities on the issue of awarding costs
against lawyers personally, Justice Granger concluded that Rule
57.07 was a codification of the common law and that the “ordinary
meaning of the words contained therein can be applied to
determine if an order for costs should be made against the solicitor
personally.”196 Justice Granger further held that “mere negligence
can attract cost consequences” as can “actions or omissions which
fall short of negligence.”197 For example, cases in which “bad
judgment” does not amount to negligence yet causes undue delay
in trial.198 Notwithstanding these statements of Justice Granger,
Ontario courts were initially split following Marchand on the issue
of whether serious misconduct or bad faith was required before a
costs order could be granted against a lawyer under Rule 57.07.199
Recent cases, however, reflect a general acceptance of interpreting
Rule 57.07 in accordance with its “ordinary meaning.”200 For
192

See, e.g., 931473 Ontario Ltd. v. Coldwell Banker Canada Inc. (1992), 5
C.P.C.(3d) 271 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Drosos v. Chong, [1992] O.J. No. 520; 8
C.P.C.(3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Bubbar v. Fabian, [1991] O.J. No. 813;
Grenier v. Southam Inc., [1993] O.J. No. 1559 (Gen. Div.); Aitken v. Aitken,
[1993] O.J. No. 2326 (Prov. Div.).
193
[1994] 17 O.R. 3d 615 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.).
194
See id. (stressing that rule 57.07 expressly provides for certain cost
consequences).
195
[1996] O.J. No. 4420 (Gen. Div.)
196
Id. at para. 122.
197
See id.
198
See id.
199
See Perell, supra note 177 at 112–14 (2001-2002) (discussing split among
Canadian courts as to whether bad faith was a strict requirement to award costs
against a solicitor).
200
Notably, in Walsh v. 1124660 Ontario Ltd., [2002] O.J. No. 4069, para. 33
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), Justice Sutherland strayed from the position that he took
in Cini v. Micallef, [1987] 60 O.R. 2d 584 (Can. H.C.J.), stating: “[a]lthough I
continue to believe that my decision in Cini v. Micallef (1987), 60 O.R. (2d)
584, arrived at the correct result on the facts of that case, I take this opportunity
to state that I now believe that I was wrong when I stated that despite the
wording of rule 57.07, the court should not award costs personally against a
solicitor except in cases of gross negligence or where the conduct of the solicitor
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example, in McDonald v. Standard Life Assurance Co.,201 Justice
Quinn states:
Rule 57.07(1) speaks of costs being "incurred
without reasonable cause" or being "wasted by ...
negligence or other default." . . . That is sufficient.
There is no need to layer rule 57.07(1) with notions
of "gross negligence," "inexcusable" or "outrageous
conduct," "conduct meriting reproof" or similar
language. Such terms describe conduct that goes
beyond what is needed to satisfy rule 57.07(1). The
wording of rule 57.07(1) is clear and simply put
and, in the end, it does not pose a very high or
onerous threshold.202
In Galganov v. Russell (Township),203 the Ontario Court of Appeal
has recently confirmed that the appropriate standard to be applied
under Rule 57.07 is as set out in Marchand and that “mere
negligence can attract costs consequences in addition to actions or
omissions which fall short of negligence.”204 It is clear that a
negligence standard now prevails in Ontario as in the United States
and England.
D.

Safeguards Introduced by Courts

is inexcusable and such as to merit reproof.” Other cases adopting an “ordinary
meaning” approach include Standard Life Assurance Co. v. Elliott, [2007] O.J.
No. 2031, para. 25 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), Rand Estate v. Lenton, [2007] O.J.
No. 831 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.), McDonald v. Standard Life Assurance Co., [2007]
O.J. No. 2334 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.), and Pineau v. Kretschmar Inc., [2004] O.J.
No. 3239 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). That said, some confusion still persists in the
case law. Cases expressing uncertainty as to the appropriate standard or
departing from an “ordinary meaning” approach include Przybysz v. Przybysz,
[2005] O.J. No. 3131 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (citing Cini v. Micallef for the
proposition that something more than mere negligence is required on the part of
counsel before the court will order costs against a solicitor personally), Bennett
v. 1377360 Ontario Corp. (c.o.b. Thyssen Elevator), [2004] O.J. No. 5240, para.
49 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (citing “an apparent conflict” in the case law as to
whether bad faith is required), Gentles v. Francis, [2009] CanLII 4854, para. 7
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (commenting that “some Courts have interpreted Young
to require a finding of bad faith before a costs order against a counsel personally
will be appropriate” but noting that “even if a finding of bad faith is not
necessary to warrant an order under Rule 57.07, the wording is discretionary,
not mandatory.”), and Martin v. Mazza, [2009] CanLII 44723 (Can. Ont. Sup.
Ct. J.) (applying a standard of serious misconduct).
201
[2007] O.J. No. 2334 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
202
Id. at para. 37.
203
2012 ONCA 410 (Can. Ont. C.A.)
204
Id. at para. 18.
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Although courts now generally accept that an order under
Rule 57.07 requires only a finding of negligence and not a finding
of bad faith, judges have expressed anxiety regarding the potential
overbreadth of the negligence standard. In Young v. Young, Justice
McLachlin had cautioned—albeit in the context of the courts’
inherent jurisdiction—that “[a] lawyer should not be placed in a
situation where his or her fear of an adverse order of costs may
conflict with these fundamental duties of his or her profession.”205
Speaking directly to Rule 57.07, Justice Quinn similarly noted in
McDonald v. Standard Life Assurance Company that a lawyer
“should not face liability under rule 57.01(1) [sic] ‘in representing
a client in respect of an issue possessing little merit simply on the
basis that the issue had little merit’ and that ‘lawyers should not be
afraid to take on, and fearlessly argue, weak issues.’”206
In view of these concerns, the courts have sought to temper
the effect of interpreting Rule 57.07 in accordance with its
“ordinary meaning” in several ways. Several decisions have
emphasized Justice Granger’s statements in Marchand that orders
under Rule 57.07 “should only be made in rare circumstances” and
that “it is only when a lawyer pursues a goal which is clearly
unattainable or is clearly derelict in his or her duties as an officer
of the court that resort should be had to rule 57.07.”207 Justice
McLachlin’s admonition in Young v. Young that “courts must be
extremely cautious in awarding costs personally against a
lawyer”208 has also been reiterated a number of times.209
Moreover, the caution urged by the courts in the application of
Rule 57.07 has been formalized in a judicially created two-part
test. In deciding whether or not to make an order against a lawyer
under Rule 57.07, the court must first determine “whether the
particular conduct complained of falls within the purview of the
rule” and, if the conduct does fall under the rule, the court must
205

See [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3. (Can.) (warning against the dangers of allowing
personal costs to be brought against an attorney).
206
See [2007] O.J. No. 2334, para. 38 (Can. Ont.) (quoting Belanger v.
McGrade Estate).
207
See Marchand [1998] O.J. No. 527 at para. 179 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.)
(describing the limited circumstances where rule 57.07 should be applied).
208
See [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3. (Can.) (explaining that the zealous representation
expected of an attorney should lead courts to be hesitant to award personal costs
against a lawyer).
209
See, e.g., Schreiber v. Mulroney, [2007] O.J. No. 3191, para. 28 (Can. Ont.)
(recognizing the standard in Marchand, but still awarding costs against the
lawyer given “egregious” and “wrong” conduct); see also, Carleton v. Beaverton
Hotel, [2009] 96 O.R. (3d) 391, 397 (Can. Ont.) (setting aside a lower court’s
decision to award costs against a lawyer personally, in part because the lower
court’s reasoning did not reflect an application of the "extreme caution"
principle).
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then decide “whether the circumstances are such that the
provisions of the rule should be invoked.”210 In deciding whether
the provisions of the rule should be invoked, the court is required
to use its discretion and exercise “extreme caution” before
deciding whether a costs order should issue.211 Most recently, in
Galganov, the Ontario Court of Appeal reiterated the need for
caution and noted that “[t]he rule was not intended to allow the
frustration of the opposing party’s counsel to be taken out against a
counsel personally because he or she went down a series of blind
alleys with his or her clients’ instructions or approval.”212
The particular cases in which Ontario courts have ordered
costs against lawyers personally are diverse. Costs orders have
been made “for failing to take instructions from a client; failing to
appear at a hearing; failing to remove [oneself] from the record
properly; mishandling an action and misleading the client;
instituting proceedings which were ill-conceived and without
merit; unreasonably and negligently causing costs to be wasted;
being responsible for intolerable delay; commencing an action to
circumvent a pending action; engaging in abusive conduct or
loquacious and repetitious interference with an examination for
discovery so that it was aborted; swearing a false and misleading
affidavit by an articled student; failing to disclose that the
defendant was bankrupt; and being responsible for unfounded
allegations of undue influence which impugned the integrity and
good faith of an executor.”213
Although the courts’ statutory jurisdiction to award costs
against lawyers personally has given rise to some concerns on the
part of courts as to potential overbreadth, the introduction of Rule
57.07 has not given rise to any significant controversy in Canada.
Although substantial amendments were made to Ontario’s Rules of
Civil Procedure in 2010 as a result of a comprehensive review of
the province’s civil justice system, no amendments were suggested
210

See Marchand, [1998] O.J. No. 527 at para. 122 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.)
(adopting test set out by Justice Haines in Worsley v. Lichong (1994) 17 O.R. 3d
615 (Can. Gen. Div.)).
211
See Carmichael v. Stathshore Indus. Park Ltd. (1999), 121 O.A.C. 289, para.
15 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (recognizing that extreme caution must be exercised when
determining whether to award costs personally against a solicitor); see also
Carleton v. Beaverton Hotel (2009), 96 O.R. 3d 391, para. 15 (Can. Ont. Sup.
Ct. J.) (reasoning that Rule 57.07 should only be applied to award costs against a
solicitor sparingly); see also A and B Auto Leasing & Car Rental Inc. v.
Mississauga Auto Clinic Inc., [2009] O.J. No. 4670, para. 32 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.
J.) (stating the second step of the inquiry into whether rule 57.07 requires courts
to apply the extreme caution principle).
212
See 2012 ONCA 410 (Can. Ont. C.A.), para. 43.
213
MARK ORKIN, THE LAW OF COSTS 2-301 – 2-302 (2nd ed., August 2010).
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to Rule 57.07. It would appear that a negligence standard is fairly
entrenched
in
Ontario.
IV.

INSIGHTS FROM CONVERGENCE

This study of the law in the United States, England, and
Canada reveals that these three common law countries have,
beginning in the mid-1980s to early 1990s, converged upon a
negligence standard to evaluate a lawyer’s conduct in the context
of deciding if a costs order should be made against that lawyer
personally. This fourth and final part considers what broader
insights might be derived from this analysis through the lens of
two inquiries: (1) what might be the reasons why this convergence
has occurred? and (2) what might be some concerns with the move
to adopting a negligence standard in this area?
A.

Why Convergence?

One might have anticipated that these jurisdictions would
differ in their treatment of costs awards against lawyers personally,
because of their very different approaches to other costs questions.
Because the United States has a baseline rule of no cost-shifting,
whereas England, Canada each implement a “loser pays” system of
costs, one might reasonably predict that the threshold at which a
lawyer is required to pay the fees of an opposing party would be
higher in the United States than in these three other countries. In
other words, one might have expected the general American
reluctance to shift costs to affect conservatively the circumstances
under which costs will be shifted in this particular scenario.214
Further, given the distinctive culture of “adversarial legalism” that
214

The United States Supreme Court has, on several occasions, distinguished
Rule 11 from a “fee-shifting statute.” See, for example, Justice O’Connor’s
comments in Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’n Enter., Inc., 498 U.S.
533, 553 (1991):
Rule 11 sanctions do not constitute the kind of fee shifting at
issue in Alyeska. Rule 11 sanctions are not tied to the outcome
of litigation; the relevant inquiry is whether a specific filing
was, if not successful, at least well founded. Nor do sanctions
shift the entire cost of litigation; they shift only the cost of a
discrete event. Finally, the Rule calls only for “an appropriate
sanction” -- attorney's fees are not mandated. As we explained
in Cooter & Gell: “Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting statute . . . . ‘A
movant under Rule 11 has no entitlement to fees or any other
sanction.’”
Very recently, the Third Circuit echoed this sentiment in Ario v. Underwriting
Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds, 618 F.3d 277, 297 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating
that “Rule 11's ‘primary purpose is not ‘wholesale fee shifting but [rather]
correction of litigation abuse’”) (citing Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847
F.2d 90, 94 (3d Cir. 1988)).
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has been said to exist in the United States, one might also have
predicted that American courts would be more restrained in their
powers to require lawyers to pay personally the fees of an
opposing party than courts in the other countries.215 That is, if the
culture of lawyering is more adversarial in the United States than
in the other countries, we might anticipate that American lawyers
will be treated as owing fewer obligations to the parties that their
clients oppose and, as a consequence, will be held responsible for
an opposing party’s legal fees in more limited circumstances.
These intuitions have not been borne out: the United States
employs a relatively similar standard to those articulated in
England and Canada in deciding if a lawyer should be required to
pay for an opposing party’s fees.
One might also have expected that the three countries
would approach the issue of when a lawyer should be personally
responsible for costs of litigation differently, in view of their
different histories in approaching lawyer negligence generally.
Lawyers in England were long protected from actions in
negligence under the doctrine of “advocates’ immunity”. One
explanation of the introduction of a negligence standard into the
English courts’ wasted costs jurisdiction is that this jurisdictional
expansion was intended to encroach upon or mitigate the effect of
the general bar on holding lawyers accountable for negligence in
civil actions. In view of the fact that neither the United States nor
Canada has recognized a comparable immunity for lawyers, one
might have expected less need or enthusiasm in these two countries
for supplementing the availability of a civil action in negligence
against lawyers with civil procedure rules that evaluate and
sanction lawyers’ negligence. Yet, all three countries employ a
relatively similar standard.
Why, then, this convergence to a negligence standard?
Each jurisdiction was facing mounting concerns at the time about
both the efficacy of its civil justice system and the ability of the
legal profession to properly regulate itself.
In England, the
question of self-regulation came to the fore most dramatically in
the enactment of the Legal Services Act, 2007. Two of the major
reforms initiated by the legislation were the establishment of a
single, independent regulator and a single, independent office to
handle consumer complaints and lawyer discipline.216 As summed
215

See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LAW 239 (2001) (discussing the role “adversarial legalism” plays in counsel fees
in the United States).
216
See JOAN LOUGHREY, CORPORATE LAWYERS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
276–77 (2011) (outlining key areas of reform implemented by England’s Legal
Services Act 2007); see also Paul D. Paton, Between a Rock and a Hard Place:
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up by one commentator, one result of the introduction of this
legislation was “the effective end of self-regulation, replaced by a
front-line regulator with closer ties to government.”217 While
developments in the United States and Canada have been less
dramatic, self-regulation of the profession has also been under
attack in these two jurisdictions in recent years.218 One possible
characterization of the introduction in these jurisdictions of more
robust mechanisms for imposing costs against lawyers is as
compensation for perceived failures of the self-regulation of the
legal profession as well as part of broader reforms seeking to make
the civil justice system more responsive to the realities of modern
litigation.
B.

Concerns with a Move to a Negligence Standard

Whatever the reasons for this convergence, the move in all
three counties to a negligence standard invites the question of
whether, as a substantive matter, the use of a negligence standard
in this particular context is a coherent and desirable way to
regulate lawyer conduct. One fundamental question that has not
been answered satisfactorily in any of the three jurisdictions
canvassed is: what, exactly, is the “new form of legal malpractice”
being established? As a general matter, in cases of “traditional”
legal malpractice (i.e. civil actions against lawyers for negligence),
a lawyer is evaluated against her “reasonably competent”
counterpart in terms of the legal skill and diligence that she has
The Future of Self-Regulation—Canada Between the United States and the
English/Australian Experience, 2008 J. PROF. L. 87, 96 (2008) (summarizing the
main components of England’s Legal Services Act 2007).
217
See Paul D. Paton, Cooperation, Co-option or Coercion? The FATF Lawyer
Guidance and Regulation of the Legal Profession, 2010 J. PROF. LAW. 165, 165
(2010) (noting fundamental changes effectuated by England’s Legal Services
Act 2007).
218
One of the most significant examples in the American context is the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s assertion of regulatory authority over
the securities bar. For a detailed discussion of this development, see DANIEL
MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A
DEMOCRATIC AGE 239–41 (2008). A notable Canadian example critical of the
self-regulation of the legal profession can be found in the Competition Bureau’s
2007 report on self-regulated professions, which viewed certain measures in the
self-regulated legal profession as anti-competitive. As part of a diplomatically
worded conclusion, the Report stated that self-regulated professions in Canada
“currently face a situation that is rich with opportunities to benefit from
increased competition.” See Competition Bureau of Canada, Study on SelfRegulated Professions: Balancing Competition and Regulation, Dec. 11, 2007,
xi, available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cbbc.nsf/vwapj/Professions%20study%20final%20E.pdf/$FILE/
Professions%20study%20final%20E.pdf (concluding that self-regulated
professions could be more competitive).
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employed in pursuing her client’s cause.
In contrast, in
determining whether or not a costs award should be made against a
lawyer personally as a result of the lawyer’s allegedly improper
litigation conduct, the court is often concerned not with whether
the lawyer in question met the requisite level of skill and care
owed to her client, but rather if the lawyer satisfied her obligations
to the court and to opposing parties. These obligations have
largely been historically understood in terms of requirements
rooted in intent and purpose rather than skill and care. For
example, a lawyer is required to refrain from abusing the courts’
processes or violating certain minimum standards of “fair play” in
relation to one’s opponents.219 What does it mean for a lawyer to
be “negligent” in relation to these obligations? The focus in
relation to obligations owed to the court and to one’s adversary
does not seem to be rooted in competence (or, at least, only rooted
in competence) but also seems to engage the issue of fidelity to
prescribed boundaries of role of an advocate.
Alternatively, if the intention in adopting a negligence
standard in this context is to move beyond traditional
understandings of a lawyer’s duty to the court and to opponents
and to create new and more expansive obligations, what are these
obligations? Asking what the “reasonably competent” lawyer
would do cannot be the starting point if a new, expansive code of
conduct is being articulated. An inquiry into the conduct of a
“reasonably competent” lawyer presumes an established
professional norm. Further, the creation of more expansive
obligations generates its own concerns and, in particular, a worry
that lawyers will find themselves in the untenable position of
choosing between representing their clients with all due vigor and
skill or protecting themselves from financial penalties. As
explored above, courts in each of three countries examined have
expressed concern about this very issue. In the American context,
both courts and commentators have commonly articulated concern
about this potential conflict in term of Rule 11’s “chilling effect” –
that is, the worry that Rule 11 puts a damper on vigorous advocacy
or the bringing of novel or creative claims.220 English courts have
219

For examples of standards in the American legal profession, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 110–15 (2000)
(stating things that a lawyer must be wary of not doing while practicing law);
see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1–3.4 (2006) (elaborating on
rules of professional conduct regarding meritorious claims and contentions,
expediting litigation, candor towards the tribunal, and fairness to opposing party
and counsel).
220
See, e.g., Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises,
Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 566 (1991) (explaining that redistribution of costs under
Rule 11 has the potential to deter meritorious lawsuits) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); see also Eastway Construc. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F. 2d
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expressed the same worry in context of their efforts, as reviewed
above, to insulate “hopeless cases” from the application of the
court’s wasted costs jurisdiction.221
The “extreme caution”
principle espoused by Canadian courts seeks to mitigate the same
perceived risk.222
Regardless of the means employed by each country to
temper the use of a negligence standard, it is unclear whether any
of these jurisdictions have fundamentally come to terms with the
consequences of introducing “a new form of legal malpractice” in
this area. Neither the “hopeless case” carve-out in England nor
the “extreme caution” advocated by the Canadian courts, let alone
the American “safe-harbor” provisions, shed much light into what
duties of care lawyers are purported to owe to courts and
opponents and how conflicts between these duties and lawyers’
duties to their clients are to be resolved. To repeat the
observations of Lord Hobhouse quoted above, although “ideally” a
lawyer’s duty to one’s client should not conflict with the lawyer’s
duty to the court, the practical realities of litigation risk giving rise
to circumstances that are not always “clear-cut.” Moreover, it also
bears mentioning that there been virtually no examination of the
tension in the case law “between denying any duty of care [in the
context of civil causes of action] by a lawyer to his client’s
opponent (save in exceptional circumstances), and permitting the
latter to recover wasted costs from the lawyer.”223 Possible
tensions between a lawyer’s obligations under statutory provisions
created personal liability for costs and other duties owed by the
lawyer to his or her client and the court will be, no doubt,
something that each jurisdiction will have to continue to deal with
into the future.
CONCLUSION
Although the general approach to costs in the American
civil justice system is commonly cited as an example of “American
243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985) (opining that Rule 11 sanctions are not intended to chill
zealous advocacy); see also GEORGENE M. VAIRO, CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES
AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES, 483–86 (2d ed. 1992); see also Carol Rice
Andrews, Motive Restrictions on Court Access: A First Amendment Challenge,
61 OHIO ST. L. J. 665, 706–07 (2000) (citing courts’ confusion in enforcing Rule
11 sanctions where there is an otherwise meritorious claim); see also Danielle
Kie Hart, supra note 68 at 2 (2002) (criticizing Rule 11 and its effect of
inhibiting the development of the common law and zealous advocacy).
221
See Ridehalgh, [1994] A.C. at 233 (cautioning against abuse of process to
pursue a “hopeless” case).
222
See Carleton, [2009] 96 O.R. 3d at para. 15 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.) (advocating
“extreme caution” standard in awarding costs against a lawyer).
223
See HUGH EVANS, LAWYERS’ LIABILITIES 91, 141 (2002).
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exceptionalism” in civil procedure, a multi-jurisdictional
examination of this particular treatment of litigation expenses
reveals that the United States is, in fact, aligned with England and
Canada in converging to a negligence standard. As explored
above, one way to understand this convergence is as part of
broader and more globally held concerns with civil justice reform
and the regulation of the legal profession. Further, the fact that the
courts in each of these jurisdictions have voiced anxiety in relation
to the use of a negligence standard in this area, in my view, brings
into sharp relief unresolved concerns about using this particular
standard in this context. Whether and how each of these
jurisdictions ultimately deal with this latent issue remains to be
seen.

